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Abstract
We consider a situation in which a transmitter Alice may wish to communicate with a receiver Bob over an
adversarial channel. An active adversary James eavesdrops on their communication over a binary symmetric channel
(BSC(q)), and may maliciously flip (up to) a certain fraction p of their transmitted bits. The communication should
be both covert and reliable. Covertness requires that the adversary James should be unable to estimate whether or
not Alice is communicating based on his noisy observations, while reliability requires that the receiver Bob should
be able to correctly recover Alice’s message with high probability.
Unlike the setting with passive adversaries considered thus far in the literature, we show that reliable covert
communication in the presence of actively jamming adversaries requires Alice and Bob to have a shared key (unknown
to James). The optimal throughput obtainable depends critically on the size of this key:
• When Alice and Bob’s shared key is less than 1
2
log(n) bits, no communication that is simultaneously covert and
reliable is possible. This is true even under reasonable computational assumptions on James, and if his jamming
is required to be causal. Conversely, when the shared key is larger than 6 log(n), the optimal throughput scales
as O(√n) — we explicitly characterize even the constant factor (with matching inner and outer bounds) for a
wide range of parameters of interest.
• When Alice and Bob have a large amount (ω(
√
n) bits) of shared key, we again present a tight covert capacity
characterization for all parameters of interest, and the capacity is independent of the number of bits in the shared
key as long as it is larger than ω(
√
n) (again regardless of computational or causality assumptions on James).
• When the size of the shared key is “moderate” (belongs to (Ω(log(n)),O(√n))), we show an achievable coding
scheme as well as an outer bound on the information-theoretically optimal throughput.
• When Alice and Bob’s shared key is O(√n log(n)) bits, we develop a computationally efficient coding scheme
for Alice/Bob whose throughput is only a constant factor smaller than information-theoretically optimal, and it
ensures both covertness and reliability even against a computationally unbounded adversary James.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of our communication schemes is of significant concern — Big Brother is often watching! While
much attention focuses on schemes that aim to hide the content of communication, in many scenarios, the fact
of communication should also be kept secret. For example, a secret agent being caught communicating with an
accomplice is of potentially drastic consequences — merely ensuring secrecy does not guarantee undetectability.
This observation has drawn attention to the problem of covert communication. In a canonical information-theoretic
setting for this problem, a transmitter Alice may wish to transmit messages to a receiver Bob over a noisy
channel, and remains silent otherwise. James eavesdrops on her transmission through another noisy channel. The
communication goals are twofold. Firstly, the communication should be covert, i.e., James should be unable to
reliably distinguish whether or not Alice is transmitting. Simultaneously, it should also be reliable, i.e. Bob should
be able to correctly estimate Alice’s transmission with a high probability of success. Recent work in the literature [1]–
[10] has quite successfully characterized the information-theoretic aspects of this problem, in terms of characterizing
the fundamental limits on the total amount of covert communication possible from Alice to Bob. Specifically, it
turns out that no more than cp,q
√
n bits may be covertly transmitted from Alice to Bob over n channel uses,
where cp,q is an explicitly characterizable constant depending on the channels from Alice to Bob and James. This
sublinear throughput (as opposed to the linear throughput in most communication settings) results from the stringent
requirement on Alice’s transmissions imposed by the need to remain covert — she must “whisper”, so to speak
(pun intended). Indeed, most of her transmitted codewords must have low Hamming weight (O(√n)).
Prior information-theoretic work on covert communication largely focuses on random noise to both Bob and
James. While such channel models are appropriate for passive eavesdroppers, a truly malicious adversary might
wish to also actively disrupt any potential communication even when it is unable to detect if transmission has
indeed taken place. To model this scenario, we take in this work a somewhat coding-theoretic view — we let the
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channel from Alice to James be probabilistic, but we allow James to try to jam the channel to Bob adversarially,
as a function of his noisy observations of Alice’s potential transmissions.
Semi-formally, in our setting, Alice’s channel input is an n-length binary vector X. The channel from Alice to
James is a Binary Symmetric Channel with transition probability q (i.e., BSC(q)). James uses his observation Z in
two ways — to detect if communication is being attempted via an estimator Φ, and to choose a binary jamming
vector S of Hamming weight at most pn — Bob receives the vector Y = X⊕S. We denote the channel from Alice
to Bob as ADVC(p|q). When Alice is silent, X must be the all-zeros vector 0; when Alice is active, the X she
transmits may be a function of the message she wishes to transmit. Alice and Bob’s encoding/decoding procedures
are known to all parties. We measure covertness via a hypothesis-testing metric — we say that the communication
is (1− d)-covert if irrespective of James’ estimator Φ, his probability of false alarm plus his probability of missed
detection is always lower-bounded by 1− d. Secondly, we require reliability — Bob should be able to reconstruct
Alice’s transmission with high probability (w.h.p.) regardless of James’ jamming strategy.
Unfortunately, in our setting this turns out to be impossible — it turns out (as we show in our first main result)
that the noise S on Bob’s channel is adversarially chosen (rather than randomly as in the classical setting, e.g. [4])
implies James can ensure any such communication protocol must be either non-covert or unreliable. This is true
even if James has computational restrictions, or is required to behave causally [11]. This is in stark contrast to the
probabilistic channel setting wherein covert and reliable communication is possible for a wide range of parameters.
Hence, we mildly relax our problem — prior to transmission, Alice and Bob secretly share a ∆(n)-bit randomly
generated shared key that is unknown to James. It turns out (as another result in this work shows) that a modest
value of1 ∆(n) = 6 log(n) suffices (and ∆(n) ≥ 12 log(n) is necessary) to instantiate throughput scaling as
r∗∆(n),d(p, q)
√
n, for a constant r∗∆(n),d(p, q) that we explicitly and tightly characterize (provide matching inner
and outer bounds) for a wide range of parameters ∆(n) (shared key size), d (covertness parameter), and p,
q (noise parameters on channels from and to James). Hence in these parameter regimes the amount ∆(n) ∈
O(log(n)) of shared key required to initiate reliable and covert communication scales much more gracefully than
the amount of communication O(√n) thereby instantiated. When the size of shared key is “moderate” (in the regime
(Ω(log(n),O(√n))), we provide inner and outer bounds on the information-theoretically optimal throughput, and
a larger amount of shared key in general yields a better inner bound. In contrast, increasing the amount of shared
key ∆(n) leads to diminishing returns in the regime ∆(n) ∈ ω(√n) — the optimal throughput possible when
∆(n) ∈ ω(√n) is the same as when ∆(n) =∞, and we are able to fully characterize this optimal throughput, as
our inner and outer bounds match in this regime. Our achievability schemes make no computational or causality
assumptions on James.
While the achievability schemes alluded to in the paragraphs above are existential and therefore have high
computational complexity for Alice/Bob, when ∆(n) ∈ Θ(√n log(n)) we demonstrate a communication scheme
that has poly(n) computational complexity for Alice/Bob, makes no computational or causality assumptions on
James, and achieves within a constant factor of the information-theoretically optimal throughput possible.
A. Related Work & Comparisons
Covert Communication: Bash et al. were the first to study covert communication for Gaussian channels in an
information-theoretic setting and demonstrate a square-root law — communication that is simultaneously covert
and reliable is possible only when the message length is O(√n) bits [1]. Their work relies on the presence of a
large amount of shared key (about O(√n log(n)) bits) between Alice and Bob. Subsequently, Che et al. showed
that for binary symmetric channels (BSCs), as long as James has a noisier channel than Bob, no shared key is
necessary [7]–[10]. Bloch et. al. [4], [12] and Wang et al. [6] then derived tight capacity characterizations for
general discrete memoryless channels (DMCs). The work in [4] also showed that the amount of shared key needed
when Bob has a noisier channel than James is O(√n). Covert communication over multiple access channels [13]
and broadcast channels [14] have also been investigated. Zhang et al. showed the first computationally efficient
communication schemes for covert communication in [15]. While prior work on covert communication focuses on
random noise channels (e.g., BSCs, AWGNs, and DMCs). To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
examine covert communication over adversarial channels.
Random noise vs adversarial noise channels: In the non-covert setting, much work has focused on two classes
of noisy channels — random noise channels and adversarial noise channels.
The capacities of random noise channels have been fully characterized by Shannon in his seminal work [16].
For instance, the capacity of a BSC(p) is given as 1 − H(p), where H(·) is the binary entropy function. On
1All logarithms in this paper are binary.
the contrary, though many upper and lower bounds (sometimes but not always matching) for a variety of special
adversarial jamming models, a tight capacity characterization for general adversarial channels (also called Arbitrarily
Varying Channels (AVCs) in the information-theory literature — see [17] for an excellent survey) is still elusive. One
way to classify adversarial models is via the adversary’s knowledge level of the transmitted codeword X. Models
of interest include classical/omniscient adversarial model [18]–[20] (full knowledge of X), the myopic adversarial
model [21]–[24] (noisy observations of X), the oblivious adversarial model [17], [25], [26] (no knowledge of X)
and the causal adversarial model [11], [27], [28] (causal observations of X). Also, the computationally bounded
adversary model [29], [30] considers models wherein Alice/Bob/James are all computationally bounded.
Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs): At a high level, reliable communication in the model considered in this
work is closely related that of communication over an AVC [17], [31], [32] with stringent input constraints. Indeed,
the impossibility result we present in Theorem 1 is motivated by the symmetrizability condition for AVCs.
1) Myopic adversaries with shared key: These are AVC problems first explicitly considered by Sarwate [22]
wherein James only observes a noisy version Z of X (for instance through a BSC(q)) before deciding on
his jamming vector S. Sarwate [22] provided a tight characterization of the throughput achievable in such
settings over general discrete input-output channels in the presence of an unlimited-sized shared key — as
such, the model therein has strong connections to the problem we consider. Indeed, the converse we present in
Theorem 2 relies heavily on the information-theoretic framework for impossibility results in AVCs in general
and [22] in particular.
2) Myopic adversaries without shared key: Problems concerning myopic adversaries without shared key between
Alice and Bob [23] are considerably more challenging than when shared key is available. However, if the
adversary is sufficiently myopic, e.g., the noise q on the BSC(q) to James is strictly larger than the fraction p
of bit flips he can impose on the channel to Bob, and there are no constraints on Alice’s transmissions, the
capacity of such a channel has been shown to exactly equal that of a BSC(p). Note that the adversarial model
of interest in this work is essentially the insufficiently myopic adversarial model due to the stringent constraints
on Alice’s X imposed by covertness.
Remark: Despite similarities, key features of general results in the AVC literature that distinguish them from those
in this work are as follows: (i) An unlimited-sized shared key between Alice and Bob is assumed, as opposed to
the careful classification of achievabilities/converses obtained in our work pertaining to differing-sized shared keys;
(ii) Covertness is not considered as in this work; (iii) Indeed, the stringent requirements in channel inputs enforced
due to covertness imply that some of the analytical techniques used in the AVC literature do not translate to our
setting; and (iv) No effort is made to consider computational restrictions on Alice/Bob/James, unlike in our work.
List decoding: One of the primitives our achievability schemes rely heavily on is that of list decoding [33]–[35].
Results in this subset of the literature guarantee that even in the presence of omniscient adversaries Bob is able to
localize Alice’s transmission to a small (often constant-sized) list at a communication rate approaching that of a
corresponding random noise channel. However, we note that the “usual” list decoding model does not translate to
our setting due to the severity of the constraint on Alice’s transmissions imposed by covertness — indeed, since
most of her transmitted codewords X must have Hamming weight O(√n), an omniscient adversary who can flip
pn bits could easily flip all the bits of X, ensuring that Bob learns nothing from his channel output Y, and hence
his list-size must be large. Hence in our work we prove a novel version of list decoding for such input-constrained
channels, in which we rely heavily on James’ myopicity.
Usage of shared key: One pathway to achievability schemes for AVCs (e.g. [36]) is to ensure that Bob can list-
decode to a small list, and then to use the key shared with Alice to disambiguate this list down to a unique message.
There are multiple such schemes in the literature, including computationally efficient schemes [37].
Permutation-based coding: Another idea in the literature that has borne multiple dividends (e.g. [36], [38]) in the
context of code design for AVCs (especially computationally efficient codes, e.g. [26], [39]) and even in covert
communication from a source-resolvability perspective [4], [40] is that of permutation-based coding. Alice and Bob
generate a small (polynomially-size) set Π (known also to James) of randomly sampled permutations as part of
code-design, and then use their shared key to pick a particular permutation pi that is unknown to James. Alice then
transmits the codeword pi(X), and Bob attempts to decode pi−1(Y). In several problems it can be shown that the
effect of this permutation pi is to “scramble” James’ jamming action, and hence makes him behave essentially like
i.i.d. noise. In our work we show that similar ideas work even in the presence of a myopic and computationally
unbounded jammer James, and results in a computationally efficient communication scheme for Alice and Bob.
Encoder
 (Alice)
BSC(q)
Decoder 
(Bob)
James
Fig. 1: System diagram.
II. MODEL
We first briefly introduce the notations used throughout this paper. Random variables are denoted by uppercase
letters, e.g., X , and their realizations are denoted by lowercase letters, e.g., x. Sets are denoted by calligraphic
letters, e.g., X . Vectors of length n are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., X and x. The i-th locations of X and x
are denoted by Xi and xi respectively.
Encoder: Let n denote the blocklength (number of channel uses) of Alice’s communication. Alice’s encoder Ψ(., ., .)
takes three inputs2: (i) The single bit transmission status T : Alice’s silence is denoted by T = 0 whereas T = 1
denotes that she is active.3 (ii) The message M , which is either 0 (if Alice is silent), or uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, . . . , N} (if Alice is active). (iii) The ∆(n)-bit shared key K distributed uniformly over {0, 1}∆(n). Prior to
transmission, only Alice knows the transmission status T and message M , and both Alice and Bob know the key
K — James is a priori ignorant of all three.
If Alice’s transmission status T equals 0 (Alice is silent), then Alice’s encoder Ψ(0, ., .) must output X = 0, a
length-n vector comprising entirely of zeros. On the other hand if Alice’s transmission status T equals 1 (Alice
is active), then Alice’s encoder Ψ(1, ., .) may output an arbitrary length-n binary vector X. The collection of all
outputs of Alice’s encoder Ψ(., ., .) is called the codebook, denoted by C. This encoder is known a priori to all
parties (Alice, Bob, and James). The rate of the code is defined as R , (logN)/n, while the relative throughput
is defined as r , (logN)/√n. 4
James’s observations: James receives the vector Z = X⊕ S¯, where S¯i is a Bernoulli(q) random variable. Hence
James’ observed vector Z is the output of a BSC(q) channel to which the input is Alice’s transmission X. On the
basis of this observation Z and his knowledge of Alice’s encoder Ψ(., ., .), James, as described below: (i) estimates
Alice’s transmission status T , and (ii) generates a jamming vector S to disrupt communication.
Estimator: James’ estimator Φ(.) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} estimates Alice’s transmission status T as Tˆ = Φ(Z). We
use a hypothesis-testing metric (defined below) to measure covertness:
2In some scenarios in the literature, in addition to the three inputs below, the encoder also incorporates additional private randomness (known
a priori only to Alice, but not to Bob or James). Indeed, in some communication scenarios [27] it can be shown that the throughput in the
presence of such private randomness is strictly higher than in its absence. However, since in this work such types of encoders do not help, we
ignore this potential flexibility in code design.
3Note that no assumptions are made about any probability distribution on T .
4The relative throughput r is commonly used in the covert communication literature to measure the size N of Alice’s potential message
since it can be shown that as the blocklength n grows without bound, N can scale as most as 2O(
√
n) (rather than 2O(n) as is common in
communication scenarios). Hence when n increases without bound, the relative throughput r scales as a constant while the rate R goes to zero.
Definition 1 (Covertness). Let α(Φ) = PrS¯(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) and β(Φ) = PrM,K,S¯(Tˆ = 0|T = 1) respectively be
the probability of false alarm and the probability of missed detection of an estimator Φ. The communication is said
to be (1− d)-covert if there does not exist an estimator Φ such that α(Φ) + β(Φ) < 1− d. 5
For the optimal estimator Φ∗, α(Φ∗) + β(Φ∗) = V(p0(Z), p1(Z)), where V(p0(Z), p1(Z)) is the variational
distance between the two distributions (corresponding to T = 0 and T = 1, respectively) on James’ observations
Z [41, Theorem 13.1.1]. In general the computational complexity of implementing the optimal estimator Φ∗ is high
(potentially exp(n)); also, analyzing its performance can also be tricky.
Jamming function: As a function of his observation Z and his knowledge of Alice’s encoding function Ψ(., ., .)
James chooses a jamming function to output a length-n binary jamming vector S of Hamming weight at most pn.
In general James’ jamming function corresponds to a conditional probability distribution pS|Z,C that stochastically
maps James’ observations to his jamming vector S. Note that pS|Z,C generates an n-letter distribution over length-n
binary sequences S, given James’ length-n observation Z, and his knowledge of Alice and Bob’s code C.
Decoder: Bob receives the length-n binary vector Y = X ⊕ S, and then applies his decoding function Γ(., .) :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}∆(n) → {0}∪{1, 2, . . . , N} to produce his message reconstruction Mˆ from his observed vector Y
and the shared key K.
Probability of decoding error: Bob’s probability of error is defined as 6
Pe(Ψ,Γ) , max
pS|Z,C
(
Pr
K,S¯,S
(Mˆ 6= 0|T = 0) + Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(Mˆ 6= M |T = 1)
)
. (1)
Remarks: a) Note that the probability as defined in (1) is maximized over the n-letter distribution pS|Z,C . This is
to indicate that there may (or may not) be a stochastic component to the jamming function James uses to generate
S from his observation Z. Hence we include an averaging over S.
b) Note that the Pe defined in (1) is the average probability of error (averaged over both the message and the
shared key). A stronger metric (that is not studied in this work) is the maximum probability of error, which would
require that for each message the corresponding probability of error is small.
Code: Alice and Bob’s code comprise of the encoder decoder pair (Ψ,Γ).
Achievable robust relative throughput/Robust covert capacity: For any 0 < p, q < 1/2, ∆(n) ≥ 0, and
sufficiently small d, a relative throughput r∆(n),d(p, q) is said to be achievable if there exists an infinite sequence
of codes (Ψn,Γn) with ∆(n) bits of shared key such that each of the codes in the sequence has relative throughput
at least r∆(n),d(p, q), limn→∞ Pe(Ψn,Γn) = 0, and ensures the communication is (1− d)-covert. Then the robust
covert capacity r∗∆(n),d(p, q) is defined as the supremum over all possible achievable relative throughputs.
Positive throughput region: For any ∆(n) and sufficiently small d, the positive throughput region R+∆(n),d(p, q)
is defined as a collection of values (p, q) such that the robust covert capacity r∗∆(n),(p, q) is positive.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We now summarize the main contributions of this work. There are at least two types of estimators and jamming
functions James can use, each of which results in a non-trivial restriction on the reliable and covert throughput
obtainable from Alice to Bob. Perhaps surprisingly, there is a unified achievability scheme that Alice and Bob can
use that meets these constraints for a wide range of parameters of interest, and thereby shows that these types of
estimators/jamming functions are in some sense optimal from James’ perspective.
• Weight-detector: This estimator (with computational complexity O(n)) merely computes the Hamming weight
of the observed Z, and if this is significantly higher than expected (qn+ ct
√
n for some constant ct), then James
estimates Tˆ = 1, i.e., that Alice is indeed transmitting.7
• Hypothesis-testing estimator: James first computes two distributions p0(Z) and p1(Z), which respectively
correspond to the distributions of Z when T = 0 and T = 1. The optimal estimator Φ∗ outputs Tˆ = 1 if
p1(z) ≥ p0(z), and outputs Tˆ = 0 if p0(z) > p1(z). Note that this estimator potentially has computational
complexity exp(n) for James.
5Note that even if James ignores the knowledge of Z, a naïve estimator Φ˜ (which always outputs T = 0 or T = 1) can also guarantee
α(Φ˜) + β(Φ˜) = 1. Therefore, the definition for covert communication implies that James’ optimal estimator Φ∗ cannot be much better than
the naïve estimator Φˆ.
6The two terms correspond to Bob’s decoder making an error in each of two scenarios: when Alice is silent, and when she is active.
7Even though this estimator is a sub-optimal proxy to the Hypothesis-testing estimator, it has been shown in [4], [7] to be “good enough”
from James’ perspective, in the sense that it constrains Alice’s throughput to the same extent as does the Hypothesis-testing estimator, which
is known [42] to be optimal.
• Oblivious jamming: This jamming strategy ignores James’ channel observations Z, and chooses S as a sum of
multiple (at most O(√n)) potentially valid transmissions from Alice. Since Bob’s observation is a sum of Alice’s
transmission X and James’ state vector S, this jamming strategy attempts to confuse Bob as to what Alice truly
transmitted. Note that this jamming strategy can be implemented by James causally, with computation complexity
at most
√
n times the computational complexity of Alice’s encoder. This converse is presented in Theorem 1.
• Myopic jamming: In this jamming strategy, even if Alice’s transmission is covert and hence James is unsure
whether or not Alice is active, James nonetheless uses his observations in Z to guess which channel uses correspond
to potential 1’s in Alice’s transmitted codeword if she indeed is active. He then preferentially flips these bits —
specifically, if Zi = 1 then he flips the corresponding Xi w.p. about p/q, but if Zi = 0 he doesn’t flip Xi. Note
that this jamming strategy can be implemented by James causally, with computation complexity linear in n. This
converse is presented in Theorem 2.
To facilitate the statement of our results, we define the following notation. For any channel parameters p, q ∈
[0, 1/2) and any sufficiently small covertness parameter d > 0, the following definitions help characterize upper
and lower bounds on the throughput.
Definition 2 (Weight normalized mutual information and code-weight parameter). The weight normalized mutual
information for Bob and James are respectively defined as
IB(p, q) ,
p(q − 1)
q
log
(
(q − p+ pq)(1− p)
p2(1− q)
)
+ log
(
q − p+ pq
pq
)
, and (2)
IJ(q) , (1− 2q) log
(
1− q
q
)
. (3)
Let the Q-function equal Q(x) = 12pi
∫∞
x
exp
(
−u22
)
du. The parameter t(q, d) equals
t(q, d) ,
2
√
q(1− q)
1− 2q ·Q
−1
(
1− d
2
)
, (4)
The parameter t(q, d) is independent of the blocklength n, corresponding to the average weight of our codewords.
Roughly speaking, “most” codewords have Hamming weight about t(q, d)
√
n. Following the techniques in [4]–
[6] it has been optimized to be as large as possible while still ensuring (1 − d) covertness. The quantity IJ(q)
denotes the mutual information (times the normalization t(q, d)
√
n) corresponding to the BSC(q) from Alice to
James, given the code-weight parameter t(q, d) on X, derived by taking the appropriate Taylor series expansion
of the mutual information between X and Z. The quantity IB(p, q) denotes the mutual information (times the
normalization t(q, d)
√
n) of the worst i.i.d. channel inducible from Alice to Bob due to an i.i.d. myopic jamming
strategy employed by James. As outlined in Theorem 2 this corresponds to the asymmetric channel arising from
James flipping Xi with probability approximately p/q within the support of Z, and 0 outside — hence James
concentrates his bit-flip power in bits he observes to be likelier to correspond to actual transmissions from Alice.
While mutual information from Alice to Bob in the presence of such an i.i.d. jamming strategy clearly serves as
an outer bound on Alice’s achievable throughput, it is perhaps more surprising that this is also achievable by our
codes in a wide range of parameter regimes (corresponding to the achievable positive throughput region presented
in Theorem 3 below).
A. Impossibility of covert communication with ∆(n) < 12 log(n)
When the amount of shared key is less than 12 log n, if James employs a weight-detector with an appropriate
threshold, combined with an oblivious jamming strategy, it turns out that he can ensure that the probability of
decoding error is bounded away from zero for any non-trivial covert codebook. Roughly speaking, since Alice’s
codebook comprises mostly of low-weight codewords, James is able to confuse Bob by choosing a jamming vector
that comprises of the sum of multiple potential codewords – “spoofs” – Bob is unable to disambiguate Alice’s true
X from among the cacophony of spoofs. In the following, let Φρ denote the weight-detector with threshold ρ, and
p
(ob)
S|Z,C denote the oblivious jamming strategy. The following theorem makes the above claim precise, and the proof
of Theorem 1 can be found in Section IV.
Theorem 1. Let d ∈ (0, 1) and ∆(n) < 12 log(n). For every sequence of codes {Cn} of blocklength n, message
length logN = nr, and encoding complexity fC(n), at least one of the following is true:
TABLE I: Summary of Main results
Theorem size of ∆(n) Relativethroughput r
Enc/Dec
Complexity Adversary Assumptions
Thm 1 (Converse) less than 12 log(n) 0 N/A O(
√
nfC(n)), causal any p, q
Thm 2 (Converse) arbitrary t(q, d)IB(p, q) N/A O(n), causal any p < q
Thm 3 (Achievability)
O(log(n))+
[t(q, d)(IJ (q)− IB(p, q))]+
√
n
t(q, d)IB(p, q) 2
O(√n) arbitrary any p < q
Thm 4 (Achievability) O(√n log(n)) t(q,d)
ρ∗ CBAC(p, q) poly(n) arbitrary any p < q
1) (Cn is not covert) There exists a detector Φ with computational complexity O(n) such that α(Φ)+β(Φ) < 1−d.
In particular, Φ can be chosen to be the weight-detector Φρ for an appropriately set threshold ρ.
2) (Cn is not reliable) There exists a constant η = η(d, p, q) and causal jamming strategy pS|Z,C with computa-
tional complexity O(√nfC(n)), such that Bob’s probability of decoding error when T = 1 is bounded from
below as
Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |T = 1) ≥ 1−max
{
2
N
,
2∆(n)η√
n
}
. (5)
In particular, pS|Z,C may be chosen as the oblivious jamming strategy p
(ob)
S|Z,C .
Remark 1. The lower bound on the probability of error in (5) is valid for all values of ∆(n). However, it is
non-vanishing only if ∆(n) < 12 log(n).
B. An upper bound on the robust covert capacity for any ∆(n)
Next, we obtain an upper bound on the robust covert capacity that holds regardless of the amount of shared
key available. Our strategy here is to bound the throughput of any simultaneously covert and reliable code by first
showing that the average Hamming weight of codewords from such a code must be bounded from above by an
appropriate function of the covertness parameter. Next, since the transmitted message must also be reliably decoded
under all jamming strategies, this gives an upper bound on the number of distinct messages possible. In order to
get a bound on the average weight of the codewords, we analyze the detection probabilities with respect to the
weight-detector Φρ with a threshold ρ that depends on the codebook. To bound the number of codewords, we
analyze Bob’s reliability with respect to the mutual information t(q, d)IB(p, q)
√
n of the channel induced under
James’ myopic jamming strategy p(my)S|Z,C . The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Section V.
Theorem 2. Let d ∈ (0, 1). For every sequence {∆(n)},
1) If 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2, then r∗∆(n),d(p, q) = 0 (corresponds to the region below the blue dashed line in Figure 2).
2) If 0 < p < q < 1/2, then r∗∆(n),d(p, q) ≤ t(q, d)IB(p, q) (corresponds to the region above the blue dashed
line in Figure 2).
Further, when 0 < p < q < 1/2 (resp. 0 < q ≤ p < 1/2), if {Cn} is a sequence of codes with relative throughput
r > t(q, d)IB(p, q) (resp. r > 0), then there exists  > 0 such that at least one of the following is true for infinitely
many values of n:
1) (Cn is not covert) There exists a detector Φ with computational complexity Θ(n) such that α(Φ)+β(Φ) < 1−d.
In particular, Φ can be chosen to be the weight-detector Φρ for an appropriately set threshold ρ.
2) (Cn is not reliable) There exists a causal jamming strategy pS|Z,C with computational complexity Θ(n) under
which Bob’s probability of decoding error when T = 1 is bounded from below as
Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |T = 1) ≥ .
In particular, pS|Z,C may be chosen to be the myopic jamming strategy p
(my)
S|Z,C .
C. Achievability of covert communication with ∆(n) ≥ 6 log(n)
Next, we give an achievability result based on low-weight random codes and list decoding. The crux of our
proof is a novel myopic list decoding lemma described in the Introduction, and formally presented in Claims 8
and 9 in Section VI-D. This lemma first demonstrates that for the parameter regime under consideration, with high
probability, from James’ perspective there are multiple (roughly exp(
√
n)) equally plausible transmissions by Alice
— hence James has a large “uncertainty set”. It then shows that, averaged over the uncertainty set, regardless of
Fig. 2: This figure shows the achievable positive throughput regions for different values of ∆(n). (1) For any ∆(n) ∈
(Ω(log(n)), o(
√
n)), as shown via Theorem 3, robust covert communication is possible above the red curve. (2) When
∆(n) ∈ Ω(√n), as shown via Theorem 3, the achievable positive throughput region increases. The two black curves delineate
the achievable positive throughput regions for ∆(n) = 0.015
√
n and 0.03
√
n respectively. The achievable positive throughput
regions for each corresponding ∆(n) are now above the respective black curves. (3) Regardless of the value of shared key
∆(n), no robust covert communication is possible below the blue dashed line corresponding to p = q. This is in contrast
to “classical” covert communication [4] in the presence of a passive adversary (rather than an actively jamming adversary),
wherein increasing amounts of shared key allow for covert communication even when p > q, i.e., the main channel from Alice
to Bob has more bit-flips than the channel from Alice to James. This is due to the fact that when p > q, among the classes of
channels James can induce from Alice to Bob is one which has zero channel capacity even if p < 1/2.
James’ specific choice of jamming vector S, very few codewords X in James’ uncertainty set are “killed”8 by S,
i.e. if Bob attempts to list-decode the corresponding Y = X ⊕ S, his list-size is “too large” (larger than some
polynomial — say n2). Hence, w.h.p. over the randomness in which X in the uncertainty set is instantiated, James
is unable to force too large a list on Bob. To complete the argument we show that the dominant error-event (among
all joint distributions James can induced between Z and S) corresponds to James behaving in the i.i.d. manner
specific in the myopic jamming strategy. Bob is then able to use the O(log(n))-sized shared key to disambiguate
the list down to a unique element via a hashing scheme. While we do not have a full characterization of the positive
throughput region when ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n),O(√n)), we present below the achievable positive throughput regions
R+∆(n),d(p, q) corresponding to the parameter regime where our codes have positive throughput. The achievable
positive throughput regions R+∆(n),d(p, q) are subsets of the true positive throughput regions R
+
∆(n),d
(p, q).
Theorem 3. Let d ∈ (0, 1) and let the shared key length ∆(n) ≥ 6 log(n). For three different regimes of ∆(n),
the achievable positive throughput regions R+∆(n),d(p, q) are given as
1) Small key: R+∆(n),d(p, q) , {(p, q) : p < q and IB(p, q) > IJ(q)} if ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n)), o(
√
n)).
2) Moderate-sized key: R+∆(n),d(p, q) , {(p, q) : p < q and IB(p, q) + σ > IJ(q)} if ∆(n) = σ
√
n for a
constant σ > 0.
3) Large key: R+∆(n),d(p, q) , {(p, q) : p < q} if ∆(n) ∈ ω(
√
n).
For any ∆(n) and (p, q) ∈ R+∆(n),d(p, q), the maximum achievable relative throughput r∆(n),d(p, q) meets the
outer bound (in Theorem 2) on robust covert capacity, i.e., r∆(n),d(p, q) = t(q, d)IB(p, q) = r
∗
∆(n),d
(p, q), and
both encoding and decoding may be performed with complexity exp(O(√n)).
8Softly, by James’ song [43].
The proof of Theorem 3 is included in Section VI. For any 0 < p < q < 1/2, to achieve relative throughput
t(q, d)IB(p, q), the minimum size of the shared key is ∆(n) = O(log(n)) + [t(q, d)(IJ(q) − IB(p, q))]+
√
n,
where x+ , max(0, x). The intuition behind this scaling of ∆(n) is as follows — when the BSC(q) channel from
Alice to James is worse (has lower mutual information) than the worst channel he can instantiate from Alice to
Bob, then O(log(n)) bits of common randomness suffice for our scheme to work. Conversely, if James can make
the channel from Alice to Bob to be worse than the channel to him, then Alice and Bob need a larger shared key
(equaling at least the mutual information difference between the two channels) to cause James’ uncertainty set to
be large enough for the myopic list decoding lemma (Claims 8 and 9) to hold. Structurally this phenomenon in
the presence of an active adversary James is intriguingly reminiscent of the phenomenon observed in [4] showing
that covert communication in the presence of a passive adversary is possible if and only if the key-rate exceeds the
normalized mutual information difference between the main channel and the eavesdropped channel.
Motivated by our results in Theorems 2 and 3, note that ∆(n) = ω(
√
n) is the same as ∆(n) =∞, since both
achievable positive throughput regime and robust covert capacity are independent of ∆(n) as long as it is larger
than ω(
√
n). Figure 2 graphically represents the numerics of Theorems 2 and 3. Comparing Theorems 2 and 3, it
is clear that, in general, the achievability and the converse may not match when ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n)), o(√n)) or
∆(n) = σ
√
n (for some small σ > 0). We believe that the gap is due to restricting our attention to computationally
efficient detection and jamming strategies for James in our converse proof. In particular, if we use the Kullback-
Leibler divergence, instead of the total variation distance to measure our covertness, and allow an optimal estimator
Φ∗ (which may be computationally inefficient), our achievable rates in Theorem 3 turn out to be optimal in all
regimes.
D. Computationally efficient codes with ∆(n) ∈ Ω(√n log n)
This result presents computationally efficient encoding and decoding schemes when the amount of shared key
is Ω(
√
n log n). Consider the Binary Asymmetric Channel (BAC) with input X ∈ {0, 1}, output Y ∈ {0, 1}, and
the bit flip probabilities Pr(Y = 1|X = 0) = p and Pr(Y = 0|X = 1) = (1 − q)p/q. This corresponds to the
channel from Alice and Bob caused by the myopic jamming strategy. Let CBAC(p, q) = maxp(X) I(X;Y ) denote
the capacity of this channel, and let Bernoulli(ρ∗) be the input distribution that achieves the maximum value of
I(X;Y ).
Theorem 4. Let d,  ∈ (0, 1), 0 < p < q < 1/2, and r < t(q,d)ρ∗ CBAC(p, q). There exists a sequence of codes
{Cn} of blocklength n and relative throughput r, and n0 such that for every n ≥ n0,
1) Cn is (1− d)-covert.
2) Cn ensures the probability of error Pe ≤ .
3) Cn can be encoded and decoded with poly(n) complexity.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Section VII. This scheme works via the permutation-based coding
described in the Introduction — Alice permutes her codeword (of Hamming weight t(q, d)
√
n) uniformly at
random among all length-n binary sequences of Hamming weight t(q, d)
√
n using her shared key. As argued
in [4], such a source-resolvability scheme results in covertness against James. Also, as argued in [36], [39] such
codes also work well to scramble James’ bit-flips, and make his actions behave in an i.i.d. manner.
Note that the above theorem does not place any computational restrictions on James. If we further allow James
to be of at most polynomial complexity, the amount of shared key needed can be significantly relaxed under the
existence of Cryptographic Pseudorandom Generators (PRG). In particular, a small length (O(nξ) for any ξ > 0)
shared key, can be used in conjunction with a PRG to generate the O(
√
n log n) length pseudorandom shared key
K. Using the code from Theorem 4, we argue that if James can distinguish T = 0 from T = 1 in polynomial time,
he should also be able to distinguish a truly random K from a pseudorandom K in polynomial time. This leads to
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let d, , ξ ∈ (0, 1), 0 < p < q < 1/2, and r < t(q,d)ρ∗ CBAC(p, q). Let ∆(n) ∈ Ω(nξ). There exists
a sequence of codes {Cn} of blocklength n and relative throughput r, and n0 such that for every n ≥ n0,
1) For every polynomial time detector Φ, α(Φ) + β(Φ) > 1− d.
2) Cn ensures the probability of error Pe ≤ .
3) Cn can be encoded and decoded with poly(n) complexity.
E. Graphical representation of capacities
Figures 3-4 give a graphical representation of the robust covert capacities.
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(a) The two sets of curves show robust covert capacities
as functions of q for two fixed values of p (p = 0.15
and p = 0.3) and different amounts of shared key ∆(n)
(∆(n) = o(
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n),∆(n) = 0.015
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n, and ∆(n) =∞).
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(b) The two sets of curves show robust covert capacities
as functions of p for two fixed values of q (q = 0.25
and q = 0.4) and different amounts of shared key ∆(n)
(∆(n) = o(
√
n),∆(n) = c(
√
n), and ∆(n) =∞).
Fig. 3: Since the robust covert capacity region would require a three dimensional plot (p and q along the x and y axes
respectively, and the relative throughput along the z axis) that is hard to digest, we instead present here cross-sections of our
partial characterization of the capacity region. The plot in Figure 3a shows inner and outer bounds on the optimal relative
throughput curves for two values of p (p = 0.15 and p = 0.3), and that in Figure 3b shows the corresponding curves for
two values of q (q = 0.25 and q = 0.4), and the covertness parameter d = 0.02 for each of these curves. For each of these
values of p/values of q, the blue dashed curves indicate outer bounds on the robust covert capacity, and indeed, these are
attainable via matching achievability schemes when ∆(n) ∈ ω(√n) — i.e., effectively unlimited-sized shared keys. As alluded
to in the achievable positive throughput region plot in Figure 2, note the impact of increasing values of ∆(n) — the achievable
positive throughput region increases, and the corresponding throughput achievable by our coding scheme in Theorem 3 tracks
the blue curve corresponding to having unbounded shared keys. The red curve corresponds to the relative throughput attainable
by our coding scheme for any value of ∆(n) ∈ (Ω(log(n)), o(√n)), and the black curve corresponds to the attainable relative
throughput for ∆(n) = 0.015
√
n in Figure 3a and ∆(n) = 0.01
√
n in Figure 3b.
(a) Robust covert capacities as functions of p for fixed q
(q = 0.4) and different covertness parameters d.
(b) Robust covert capacities as functions of q for fixed p
(p = 0.15) and different covertness parameters d.
Fig. 4: The covertness parameter d also has an impact on the robust covert capacity — as shown in Figures 4a and 4b,
increasing d increases the robust covert capacity, since Alice’s codebook can comprise of somewhat “heavier” codewords.
TABLE II: Table of parameters
Symbol Description Equality/Range Section
M Message M ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} Section II
T Transmission status T ∈ {0, 1} Section II
K Shared key K ∈ {0, 1}∆(n) Section II
p ADVC(p) – channel from Alice to Bob 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.5 Section I
q BSC(q) – channel from Alice to James 0 ≤ q < 0.5 Section I
d Covertness parameter d > 0 Section II
∆(n) Size of shared key N/A Section II
t(q, d) Code-weight design parameter t(q, d) =
2
√
q(1−q)
1−2q ·Q−1
(
1−d
2
)
Section III
ρ Normalized code-weight design parameter ρ = t(q, d)/
√
n Section III
C Code N/A Section II
Ψ Alice’s encoder N/A Section II
Γ Bob’s decoder N/A Section II
Φ James’ estimator N/A Section II
α(Φ) Probability of false alarm α(Φ) = PrS¯(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) Section II
β(Φ) Probability of missed detection β(Φ) = PrS¯(Tˆ = 0|T = 1) Section II
X Codeword X ∈ {0, 1}n Section II
Z James’ received vector Z ∈ {0, 1}n Section II
S James’ jamming vector S ∈ {0, 1}n Section II
Y Bob’s received vector Y ∈ {0, 1}n Section II
R Rate R = (logN)/n Section II
r Relative throughput r = (logN)/
√
n Section II
r∗∆(n),d(p, q) Robust covert capacity N/A Section II
R+∆(n),d(p, q) Positive throughput region N/A Section II
R+∆(n),d(p, q) Achievable positive throughput region N/A Section II
p0(Z) Innocent distribution of Z (T = 0) N/A Section II
p1(Z) Active distribution of Z (T = 1) N/A Section II
EC(p1(Z)) Ensemble-averaged active distribution N/A Section II
IJ(q) Weight normalized mutual information N/A Section III
IB(p, q) Weight normalized mutual information N/A Section III
AX n-letter typical set of X N/A Section VI-A
AZ n-letter typical set of X N/A Section VI-A
fxyij Fraction of pair (i, j) in (x,y) N/A Section VI-A
fxzij Fraction of pair (i, j) in (x, z) N/A Section VI-A
AX|z n-letter conditionally typical set of X N/A Section VI-A
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) n-letter conditional type class of X N/A Section VI-A
Fxzn Set of typical fractional Hamming weight N/A Section VI-A
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We now show that if ∆(n) < 12 log(n), the probability of error is bounded from below by 1−max
{
2
N ,
2∆(n)η√
n
}
,
for some constant η independent of n. First note that due to the covertness constraint, most of the codewords have
Hamming weight O(√n), otherwise Alice’s transmission status can be detected by James’ weight-detector. Since
James is able to flip O(n) bits, he can apply an oblivious jamming strategy — generate his jamming vector by
selecting O(√n) codewords. Since the number of possible values of shared key is 2∆(n) < O(√n), he can select
codewords in the following way (without loss of generality we assume Alice chooses x(m0, k0) – the codeword
corresponding to message m0 and shared key k0 – is transmitted):
1) For each value of k, James randomly chooses b = min
{
O(√n)
2∆(n)
, N2
}
messages m1,m2, . . . ,mb, and use Alice’s
encoding function to obtain codewords x(m1, k),x(m2, k), . . . ,x(mb, k).
2) Let Sk be the set with elements x(m1, k),x(m2, k), . . . ,x(mb, k). James’ jamming vector s equals ⊕k⊕Sk x,
i.e., the binary additions of all selected codewords. Note that Bob’s received vector y equals the binary addition
of x(m0, k0) and s.
Now let’s focus on the set Sk0 . We define a modified set Sˆk0 , Sk0 \ x(m0, k0) if x(m0, k0) ∈ Sk0 , and
Sˆk0 , {x(m1, k0),x(m2, k0), . . . ,x(mb, k0),x(m0, k0)} if x(m0, k0) /∈ Sk0 . We assume there is an oracle who
reveals to Bob the value of k0, the set Sˆk0 , and all Sk for k 6= k0 selected by James, and the fact that whether
or not Alice’s true codeword in the set Sˆk0 . Note that the oracle only strengthens Bob, since he can recover the
received vector from the oracle revealed information. Thus, Bob’s probability of decoding error with the knowledge
of the oracle information is no larger than that without it. If x(m0, k0) ∈ Sˆk0 , from Bob’s point of view the true
message is uniformly distributed over the set Sˆk0 , since he cannot distinguish the following (b+ 1) equally likely
events
• Em0 : Alice transmits x(m0, k0) and James selects {x(m1, k0),x(m2, k0), . . . ,x(mb, k0)}.
• Emi (i 6= 0): Alice transmits x(mi, k0) and James selects {x(m0, k0),x(m1, k0), . . . ,x(mb, k0)} \ x(mi, k0).
Similarly, if x(m0, k0) /∈ Sˆk0 , from Bob’s point of view the true message is uniformly distributed over the set Sˆck0 .
These imply the probability of decoding error (when T = 1) is bounded from below by 1−max
{
2∆(n)η√
n
, 2N
}
, for
some η > 0.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider any code C of relative througput r that ensures (1− d)-covertness and the average probability of error
Pe ≤ n (where n → 0 as n → ∞). We first find an upper bound on the maximum weight of codewords in a
suitable subcode and then, use it find a bound on the maximum number of messages that can be reliably decoded.
To get an upper bound in the average weight of codewords, we employ an analysis based on weight detection
as in [5], [7]. Specializing [5, Lemma 12] to our setting, we obtain that for any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a subset Cγ
of C such that
1) |Cγ | ≥ γ|C|
2) there is a constant C such that
ρ(Cγ) , 1√
n
max
x∈Cγ
wt(x) ≤ 2
√
q(1− q)
1− 2q Q
−1
(
1− d
2
− C√
n
− γ
)
.
Next, consider the jamming strategy p(my)S|Z,C described as follows. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, James does not flip bit
Xi if the corresponding Zi he observes equals 0, and flips with probability approximately p/q if the corresponding
Zi he observes equals 1. This ensures that his bit-flips are stochastically distributed in the support of the Z vector.
Since the Z vector is correlated with Alice’s transmission X via a BSC(q), this ensures that James’ jamming vector
S is likelier to flip 1’s in X to 0’s, than it is to flip 0’s in X to 1’s.
More precisely, let ν = n−1/3 be a slackness parameter. For any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
Si =

0, with probability 1 if Zi = 0,
0, with probability 1− p(1−ν)q if Zi = 1,
1, with probability p(1−ν)q if Zi = 1,
Note that generating S in the i.i.d. manner specified above may in general result in James’ exceeding his jamming
budget pn. However, by setting the slackness parameter ν = n−1/3, we ensure with probability at least 1 −
exp(−O(n1/3)), the Hamming weight of S is bounded from above by pn.9 This jamming strategy induces a
Binary Asymetric Channel from Alice to Bob with channel transition probabilities
pY |X(Yi = 0|Xi = 0) = 1− p(1− ν), pY |X(Yi = 1|Xi = 0) = p(1− ν),
pY |X(Yi = 0|Xi = 1) = (1− q)p
q
(1− ν), pY |X(Yi = 1|Xi = 1) = 1− (1− q)p
q
(1− ν).
Note that pY |X(Yi = 0|Xi = 1) > pY |X(Yi = 1|Xi = 0) since q < 1/2 — i.e., as mentioned above, the probability
of a bit-flip is higher when Xi = 1, than when Xi = 0.
Suppose now that Alice uses the code Cγ with γ = max{√n, exp(−n 12−ε)} for some ε > 0. Note that the
average probability of error with Cγ , denoted by ′n, is bounded from above as
′n ≤ n/γ = max{
√
n, exp(−n 12−)},
since |Cγ |′n ≤ |C|n if Bob simply employs the decoding rule for C. Note that ′n → 0 as n → ∞. Let X¯ ∼
Bernoulli(ρ(Cγ)/
√
n) and let Y¯ be the random variable corresponding to the output of the above BAC with input
X¯ . By standard information inequalities, we bound the relative throughput of Cγ as follows.
r
√
n− log γ = H(M) = I(M ;YK) +H(M |YK) (6)
9The choice of the slackness parameter ν specfically as n−1/3 is not critical – for any ε > 0 anything in the range n−1/2+ε to n−ε would
also work.
≤ I(M ;YK) + ′n · (r
√
n) + 1 (7)
= I(M ;Y|K) + ′n · (r
√
n) + 1 (8)
≤ I(MK;Y) + ′n · (r
√
n) + 1 (9)
≤ I(X;Y) + ′n · (r
√
n) + 1 (10)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi) + 
′
n · (r
√
n) + 1
≤ nI(X¯; Y¯ ) + ′n · (r
√
n) + 1 (11)
Inequality (7) follows from the Fano’s inequality, (8) holds since I(M ;YK) = I(M ;Y |K) + I(M ;K) and M
is independent of K. Similarly, inequality (9) holds since I(M ;Y|K) = I(MK;Y) − I(K;Y) ≤ I(MK;Y).
Inequality (10) is due to the Data processing inequality. (11) is due to the concavity of mutual information with
respect to the marginal distributions. Hence we have
r ≤ 1
1− ′n
√
nI(X¯; Y¯ ) +
1 + log γ
(1− ′n)
√
n
, (12)
where 1+log γ
(1−′n)
√
n
goes to 0 for sufficiently large n, since γ = max{√n, exp(−n 12−ε)}. The mutual information
I(X¯; Y¯ ) can be approximated as
√
nI(X¯; Y¯ )
=
√
n(H(Y¯ )−H(Y¯ |X¯))
n→∞
=
ρ(Cγ)p(q − 1)
q
log
(
(1− p)(q − p+ pq)
p2(1− q)
)
+ ρ(Cγ) log
(
q − p+ pq
pq
)
,
n→∞
= t(q, d) · IB(p, q).
Hence, we obtain that r ≤ t(q, d) · IB(p, q). Note that IB(p, q) = 0 when p = q, and thus, r = 0 whenever p ≥ q.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
As presented in Theorem 3, if IJ(q) < IB(p, q), the optimal throughput t(q, d) ·IB(p, q) is achievable with only
O(log(n)) bits of shared key. We first introduce important definitions and our coding schemes in subsections VI-A
and VI-B respectively, and then formally present the detailed proofs in subsections VI-C and VI-D. In subsec-
tion VI-E, we also discuss how to achieve the optimal throughput t(q, d) · IB(p, q) with a large amount of shared
key when (p, q) satisfies IJ(q) > IB(p, q) > 0.
A. Definitions of typical sets and type classes
The fractional Hamming weight of x and z are respectively denoted by
fx1 (x) ,
wtH(x)
n
, (13)
fz1 (z) ,
wtH(z)
n
. (14)
Since the codeword X is generated i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(ρ), we define the n-letter typical set of X as
AX , {x ∈ {0, 1}n : fx1 (x) ∈ [ρ · (1±∆x1)]} . (15)
As mentioned earlier, the ensemble-average active distribution of Z is a Binomial(n, ρ ∗ q) distribution, where the
binary convolution ρ∗q , ρ(1−q)+q(1−ρ). Thus, we define the n-letter typical set of Z when Alice is transmitting
(T = 1) as
AZ , {z ∈ {0, 1}n : fz1 (z) ∈ [(ρ ∗ q) · (1±∆z1)]} . (16)
By choosing ∆x1 and ∆
z
1 carefully, we ensure the typical sets AX and AZ are high probability set, and are also as
“narrow” as possible. Throughout this work we set ∆x1 = 1 and ∆
z
1 = n
−1/4. Next, we denote the fraction of pair
(i, j) in (x,y) by
fxyij (x,y) ,
|k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (xk, yk) = (i, j)|
n
, where i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1}, (17)
and similarly, the fraction of pair (i, j) in (x, z) is denoted by
fxzij (x, z) ,
|k ∈ {1, . . . , n} : (xk, zk) = (i, j)|
n
, where i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1}. (18)
Moreover, given a fixed z, we define the n-letter conditionally typical set of X as
AX|z ,
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : f
xz
10 (x, z) ∈ [ρq(1±∆xz10 )]
fxz11 (x, z) ∈ [ρ(1− q)(1±∆xz11 )]
}
, (19)
and the n-letter conditional type class of X as
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ,
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n :
∣∣i : (xi, zi) = (1, 0)∣∣ = nfxz10∣∣i : (xi, zi) = (1, 0)∣∣ = nfxz10
}
, (20)
where ∆xz10 = ∆
xz
11 = n
−1/8. It is worth noting that the conditionally typical set can be represented as the union of
many conditional type classes, i.e.,
AX|z =
⋃
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), (21)
where Fxzn is the set of typical fractional Hamming weight, and is defined as
Fxzn ,
(fxz10 , fxz11 ) :
fxz10 ∈ [ρq(1±∆xz10 )]
fxz11 ∈ [ρ(1− q)(1±∆xz11 )]
nfxz10 ∈ Z
nfxz11 ∈ Z
 . (22)
B. Code design
Polynomial hash function: Alice and Bob have 6 log(n) bits of shared key K, which is partitioned into two
equal parts K1 and K2. Each part of the key contains 3 log(n) bits, and hence can be viewed as an element of
finite field Fn3 . The message M can also be partitioned into 3 log(n) sized small chunks M1,M2, . . . ,Ml, where
l = r
√
n/(3 log(n)). Likewise, each message chunk Mi is also viewed as an element of Fn3 . The polynomial hash
function is defined as
hK(M) = K2 +
l∑
i=1
Ki1Mi, (23)
where the additions and the multiplications are operated over Fn3 . Note that this usage of shared key is distinct
from the manner in which shared key is used in a wiretap secrecy setting. In particular, in a wiretap secrecy setting,
it is highly unlikely that a single codeword could correspond to many message-key pairs, while in our constructions,
each codeword corresponds to multiple different message-key pairs. This property is critical since it ensures part of
the shared key (K1 in this work) is uniformly distributed from James’ perspective even if he gains some information
from his received vector, and this uniformity helps us to analyze the list decoding argument.
Codebook generation: Let the relative throughput r = t(q, d)IB(p, q)−δ, where δ > 0. For each message-hash pair
(m,h) ∈ {0, 1}r
√
n × {0, 1}3 log(n), we generate a length-n codeword xmh according to pX ∼ i.i.d. Bernoulli(ρ).
For different message-hash pairs, the codewords are generated independently. The codebook is a collection of
xmh,∀(m,h).
Encoder: To transmit a message m, Alice computes a hash hk(m) using the polynomial hash function and the
shared key k. She then encodes the pair (m,hk(m)) to the codeword xmhk(m). In the following we abbreviate
(m,hk(m)) and xmhk(m) as (m,h(m)) and xmh(m) respectively.
Decoding rule: Given a received vector y, the list decoder L(y) contains all the codewords satisfying the following
constraints:
L(y) ,
x : nf
xy
10 (x,y) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + ε1)
nfxy11 (x,y) > ρn
(
1− p(1−q)q
)
(1− ε2)
 , (24)
In this work we set ε1 = 1log(n) and ε2 =
p−pq
(q−p+pq) log(n) , and explain the reason for such choices in subsection VI-D.
The decoding rule is as follows:
1) Output all the codewords satisfying the list decoding rule (24) to L(y).
2) For each xmh ∈ L(y), keep it in the list if xmh is consistent with the shared key k, i.e., h = k2 +
∑l
i=1 k
i
1mi,
and throw it out otherwise.
3) Decode Mˆ = m if there is exactly one codeword xmh(m) left in the list. Decode Mˆ = 0 if there is no
codeword left in the list. Declare an error if there is more than one codeword left in the list.
Decoding error events: When Alice is active (T = 1), the three possible error events are as follows (without loss
of generality, suppose M = m and hence xmh(m) is transmitted):
• E1: The transmitted codeword xmh(m) does not fall into the list L(y).
• E2: The number of codewords x′ 6= xmh(m) falling into the list L(y) is greater than n2.
• E3: There exists x′ 6= xmh(m) such that x′ ∈ L(y) and x′ is consistent with k.
Generally speaking, the list decoder should contain the correct codeword xmh(m), and also keep the size as small
as possible (no larger than n2). The corresponding error events are E1 and E2. Secondly, even if the list decoder
does not make an error, one still need to worry the situation in which more than one codeword in L(y) is consistent
with the shared key k. In particular, the true codeword xmh(m) is definitely consistent with k, so we hope none of
the other codewords x′ 6= xmh(m) are consistent with k, which corresponds to E3.
When Alice is silent (T = 0), a decoding error occurs if there exists a codeword x ∈ L(y) such that x is
consistent with k, hence the two possible error events are
• E4: The total number of codewords x ∈ C falling into the list L(y) is greater than n2.
• E5: There exists x ∈ L(y) such that x is consistent with k.
C. Proof of covertness
The proof of covertness essentially connects to the analysis of the distributions of James’ channel outputs Z.
Recall that by Definition 1, the code is (1− d)-covert if there is no estimator Φ such that α(Φ) + β(Φ) < 1− d.
Let p0(Z) be the n-letter innocent distribution of James’ channel output Z when Alice is silent (T = 0), and p1(Z)
be the n-letter active distribution of James’ channel output Z when Alice is transmitting (T = 1). A standard
statistical arguments [41] shows that the optimal estimator Φˆ satisfies α(Φˆ) + β(Φˆ) = 1−V(p0(Z), p1(Z)), where
V(·, ·) is the variational distance between two distributions.
Claim 1. To prove (1− d)-covertness, it suffice to show V(p0(Z), p1(Z)) , 12
∑
z
∣∣p0(z)− p1(z)∣∣ ≤ d.
The n-letter innocent distribution p0(Z) is a Binomial(n, q) distribution, with
p0(z) , qwtH(z)(1− q)(n−wtH(z)), ∀z ∈ {0, 1}n. (25)
The n-letter active distribution p1(Z) is averaged over all the codewords, and is denoted by
p1(z) ,
∑
x∈C
p(x)pZ|X(z|x) = 1|C|
∑
x∈C
qdH(x,z)(1− q)(n−dH(x,z)), ∀z ∈ {0, 1}n, (26)
where dH(·, ·) is the Hamming distance between two vectors. Note that each of the codeword in C is equally likely
to be transmitted, i.e., p(x) = 1/|C|. Equation (26) follows from the total probability theorem and the fact that pZ|X
depends only on the Hamming distance between x and z. Note that the active distribution p1(Z) has complicated
dependence on the codebook C, hence for the purpose of analysis, we also define an n-letter ensemble-averaged
active distribution EC (p1(Z)) as
EC (p1(z)) ,
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C
p(x)pZ|X(z|x) = (ρ ∗ q)wtH(z)(1− ρ ∗ q)(n−wtH(z)), ∀z ∈ {0, 1}n, (27)
The distribution EC (p1(Z)) is essentially the active distribution p1(Z) averaged over all the possible codebooks.
As derived in (27), EC(p1(Z)) is a Binomial(n, ρ ∗ q) distribution, which can be viewed as passing the all-zero
codeword through two successive BSCs with crossover probabilities respectively ρ and q. For convenience, we
abbreviate p0(Z), p1(Z),EC(p1(Z)) as p0, p1,EC(p1) respectively, when the meaning is clear from the context.
To prove (1 − d)-covertness, it suffices to show V(p0, p1) ≤ d, by Claim 1. Applying the triangle inequality,
we obtain that V(p0, p1) ≤ V(p0,EC(p1)) + V(EC(p1), p1). Lemmas 1 and 2 below respectively establish that
• limn→∞ V(p0,EC(p1)) ≤ d.
• limn→∞ V(EC(p1), p1) = 0 with high probability over the code design.
Lemma 1. By setting the “code-weight design” parameter t = 2
√
q(1−q)
1−2q Q
−1 ( 1−d
2
)
, the variational distance
between the innocent distribution p0 and the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(p1) is given as
lim
n→∞V(p0,EC(p1)) = d.
Proof: As shown in [44, Lemma 9], the variational distance can be expressed as
V(EC(p1), p1) = 1− 2Q
(
t(1− 2q)
2
√
q(1− q)
)
+O
(
1√
n
)
, (28)
by applying the Berry-Esseen theorem. Since the “code-weight” design parameter t is set to equal 2
√
q(1−q)
1−2q Q
−1 ( 1−d
2
)
,
we obtain
lim
n→∞V(p0,EC(p1)) = d. (29)
In addition to studying the averaged performance of the random code ensemble, we also need to guarantee the
specific performance of a randomly chosen code does not deviate the average performance “too much”, i.e., with
high probability over the code design, V(EC(p1), p1) goes to 0 as n goes to infinity. Note that
V(EC(p1), p1) =
1
2
∑
z∈{0,1}n
∣∣∣∣∣∑C pC(C)
∑
x∈C
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ (30)
≤ 1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (31)
+
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (32)
+
1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∑C pC(C)
∑
x∈C
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ (33)
≤ 1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (34)
+
1
2
EC
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
+ 1
2
EC
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z)
 (35)
+
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) + 1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z). (36)
The variational distance V(EC(p1), p1) is divided into three terms — term (31) corresponds to the variational distance
contributed by typical z and conditionally typical x, term (32) corresponds to the variational distance contributed by
typical z and conditionally atypical x, and term (33) corresponds to the variational distance contributed by atypical
z. Since typical z and conditionally typical x covers almost all the probability mass, a primary goal is to bound
term (34), which is the same as term (31). Also, we simply use triangle inequalities to bound the atypical events
in (35) and (36). Before bounding these terms, we first prove the following claim, which is widely used throughout
this work.
Claim 2. For any typical z and any conditionally typical type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), the expected number of
codewords falling into TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is super-polynomially large, i.e., EC
(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣) = 2c√n,
where c = r− t · IJ(q) > 0. With probability at least 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen
code C satisfies∣∣∣∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣− EC(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣)∣∣∣∣ < exp(−n 14 )EC(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣).
Proof: Note that the expected number of codewords falling into the a type class equals the probability of a codeword
falling into the type class times the total number of codewords. By a counting argument, the probability is given as
Pr
C
(
X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )
)
(37)
=
(
n(fxz01 + f
xz
11 )
nfxz11
)
ρnf
xz
11 (1− ρ)nfxz01 ·
(
n(fxz00 + f
xz
10 )
nfxz10
)
ρnf
xz
10 (1− ρ)nfxz00 (38)
≥ 1
(n+ 1)2
2
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )H
(
fxz11
fxz01 +f
xz
11
)
2
n(fxz00 +f
xz
10 )H
(
fxz10
fxz00 +f
xz
10
)
· ρnfxz11 +nfxz10 (1− ρ)nfxz01 +nfxz00 (39)
=
1
(n+ 1)2
2nH(x|z)2n[(f
xz
11 +f
xz
10 ) log ρ+(1−fxz11 −fxz10 ) log(1−ρ)] (40)
=
1
(n+ 1)2
2nH(x|z)2−n[H(x)+D(x‖ρ)] (41)
= 2−n[I(x;z)+D(x‖ρ)]−2 log(n+1). (42)
As first shown in [7], for any typical z and any conditionally typical x, i.e., (fxz10 , f
xz
11 ) ∈ Fxzn ,
I(x; z) = ρ(1− 2q) log
(
1− q
q
)
+O(n−3/4), (43)
D(x ‖ ρ) = O(1). (44)
Therefore, the expected number of codewords falling into TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is bounded from below as
µ1 , EC
(∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣∣) ≥ 2r√n · 2−t(1−2q) log((1−q)/q)√n+o(√n) (45)
n→∞
= 2(r−t·IJ (q))
√
n. (46)
Since r > IJ(q) in the positive throughput regime, the expected number of codewords falling into is at least 2c
√
n,
where c = r−t·IJ(q) > 0. By using the Chernoff bound, we prove that with probability at least 1−2 exp
(− 132Aµ1),
a randomly chosen code satisfies∣∣∣∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣− EC(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣)∣∣∣∣ < AEC(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣).
(47)
By setting A = exp(−n 14 ), we complete the proof of Claim 2.
Lemma 2. With probability at least 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen code C ensures
that V(EC(p1), p1) ≤ exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
.
Proof: We first bound the term in (34) (corresponding to typical z and conditionally typical x) in the following. The
key step is to decompose the the conditionally typical setAX|z into conditionally typical type classes TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ),
where (fxz10 , f
xz
11 ) ∈ Fxzn . For any typical z, we have∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) (48)
=
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
∑
x∈C∩TX|z(fxz10 ,fxz11 )
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) (49)
=
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) ·
∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣∣ (50)
=
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) · EC
(∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣∣) . (51)
The reason why we make the type classes decomposition in (49) is that all the codewords in the same type class
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) have same Hamming distance from z, hence the channel transition probability pZ|X(z|x) is the
same, and the summation problem can be converted to a counting problem in (50). Combining (51) and (34), we
have
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (52)
=
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣− EC(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣)∣∣∣∣
(53)
w.h.p.
<
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) · exp(−n 14 ) · EC
(∣∣x : x ∈ C ∩ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣) (54)
=
exp(−n 14 )
2
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
∑
x∈C∩TX|z(fxz10 ,fxz11 )
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) (55)
≤ exp(−n
1
4 )
2
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
z
∑
x∈C
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) (56)
=
exp(−n 14 )
2
. (57)
Inequality (54) follows from Claim 2, and holds with probability at least 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)). Note that in order
to obtain (54), one needs to take a union bound over exponentially many typical z and conditionally typical type
class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), which is valid since 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) is super-exponentially close to one. We exchange the
order of summation in equation (55), and relax the constraints on z and x to obtain inequality (56).
After showing that the variational distance V(EC(p1), p1) contributed by typical z and conditionally typical x
goes to 0 asymptotically, we then bound the atypical events (as shown in (35) and (36)) in Claims 3-5, with proofs
deferred to Appendix A.
Claim 3 (Second term in (35)). 12EC
(∑
z/∈AZ p1(z)
) ≤ exp (−O(√n)) .
Claim 4 (First term in (35)). 12EC
(∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
)
≤ exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
.
Claim 5 (Term in (36)). With probability at least 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen
code C satisfies
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) + 1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z) ≤ exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
. (58)
Equipped with (57) and Claims 3-5, we are able to bound the variational distance between p1 and EC(p1) from
above as
V(EC(p1), p1) (59)
≤ 1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (60)
+
1
2
EC
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
+ 1
2
EC
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z)
 (61)
+
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) + 1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z). (62)
w.h.p.
<
1
2
exp(−n 14 ) + exp (−O(√n))+ exp(−O (n 14))+ exp(−O (n 14)) (63)
= exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
, (64)
where equations (60)-(62) are derived in (34)-(36), and equation (63) holds with probability at least 1−exp(−2O(
√
n)).
This completes the proof of Lemma 2, as well as the proof of covertness.
D. Proof of reliability
Suppose a codeword xmh(m) (corresponding to the message m) is transmitted. After passing through a BSC(q),
a noisy version z of xmh(m) is received by James. We now consider the error events E1, E2, E3 when Alice is active
(T = 1). The following three lemmas establish the reliability.
Lemma 3. With probability at least 1− exp(−O(n1/4)) over the code design, a randomly chosen code C ensures
that the error event E1 occurs with probability at most 3 exp(−n1/8).
Lemma 4. With probability at least 1− exp(−O(√n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen code C ensures
that the error event E2 occurs with probability at most exp(−n1/4).
Lemma 5. The error event E3 occurs with probability (over the common randomness K) at most O
(
1√
n log(n)
)
.
1) Proof of Lemma 3: Recall that the error event E1 occurs if the transmitted codeword xmh(m) does not fall into
the list under the jamming vector s, i.e., xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s). In the following we prove that for any shared
key k, the probability of error event E1 is bounded from above by 3 exp(−n1/8), which is a stronger criterion
than that averages over all k. Note that for a fixed k, each message m maps to a unique codeword xmh(m). The
probability of error event E1 is given as
P (1)e (C) (65)
= max
pS|Z,C
{∑
m
pM (m)
∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}
}
(66)
≤ max
pS|Z,C
 1N ∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m)∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}

+ max
pS|Z,C
 1N ∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}

+ max
pS|Z,C
∑
m
1
N
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}
 (67)
≤ max
pS|Z,C
 1N ∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m)∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}
 (68)
+
1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) + 1
N
∑
m
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)). (69)
In (67), we separately consider typical z and atypical z, and conditionally typical codewords and conditionally
atypical codewords. Inequality (69) follows since the indicator function 1(.) is always bounded from above by one.
The following two claims shows that the two atypical events goes to 0 as n grows without bound, and we defer
the proofs to Appendix B.
Claim 6 (First term in (69)). With probability at least 1− exp(−O(n1/4)) over the code design,
1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) < exp(−n1/8).
Claim 7 (Second term in (69)). With probability at least 1− exp(−O(√n)) over the code design,
1
N
∑
m
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) < exp(−n1/4).
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Fig. 5: We consider a typical z and a typical conditional type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) with respect to z. We prove that the number
of codewords falling into TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is super-polynomially large, and no matter which which jamming vector s is chosen,
only a small fraction of codewords that belong to TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) are killed.
From now on we consider the typical event — a typical z is received and a conditionally typical x is transmitted.
From James’ perspective, all the codewords that are conditionally typical with respect to z are “plausible”. We
introduce an oracle which helps James by revealing the type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) that the transmitted codeword
xmh(m) lies in. If our coding scheme is proven to be reliable against the stronger adversary, it will also succeed
against the original adversary. Given the oracle revealed information, James’ uncertainty is reduced since he knows
only the codewords in TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) are likely to be the transmitted codeword. However, in Claim 8 we show that
James’ remaining uncertainty is still very high — the number of codewords in TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is super-polynomially
large. We skip the proof here since it follows directly from Claim 2.
Claim 8. For any typical z and any conditionally typical type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), the expected number of
codewords falling into TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is super-polynomially large, i.e., EC
(∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣) =
2c
√
n, where c = r − t · IJ(q) > 0. With probability at least 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly
chosen code C satisfies ∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣ > (1− exp(−n 14 )) · 2c√n.
Note that the error event E1 happens if the transmitted codeword xmh(m) is not contained in the list. To reliable
decode, xmh(m) should be “robust” under James’ malicious jamming vector s.
Definition 3. A codeword x (transmitted from Alice to Bob) is killed by a jamming vector s if x is pushed out of
the list decoder by s, i.e., x /∈ L(x+ s).
If magically James is able to find a jamming vector s such that each of the codeword in TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) is killed
by s, the error event E1 will occur with probability one, since the transmitted codeword belongs to TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ).
Fortunately, Claim 9 shows that with high probability over the code design, no matter which s James chooses,
only a decaying fraction of codewords in TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) are killed by s. Since the probability of the error event
E1 is averaged over all the codewords to be transmitted, and each codeword is transmitted with equal probability
a priori, we are able to prove that a decaying fraction of codewords are killed implies the probability of E1 is a
decaying function of n (in Claim 10). Finally, one needs to take a union bound over all typical z and conditionally
typical type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ).
Claim 9 (Myopic list decoding lemma). For any typical z and any conditionally typical type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ),
for any fixed jamming vector s ∈ {0, 1}n, with probability at least 1− exp
(
−2O(
√
n)
)
over the code design,∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩ xmh(m) /∈ L(x+ s)∣∣ < exp(−n1/4) · 2c√n.
Proof: The key step is to calculate the probability that a randomly generated codeword x falls into the the type
class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), and is simultaneously killed by a jamming vector s. One can argue that this probability is
maximized when the support of s is entirely inside the support of z. We now fix a typical z and a worst-case
Fig. 6: The black region represents ones in the vector while the white region represents zeros in the vector. We denote the joint
type classes between X and Z,S,Y respectively by fxzij , f
xs
ij , f
xy
ij , for (i, j) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}.
jamming vector s satisfying
∣∣supp(z) ∩ supp(s)∣∣ = pn. Recall that a codeword x falls into the list L(y) (or
L(x+ s)) if it satisfies the decoding rulenf
xy
10 (x,y) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + ε1),
nfxy11 (x,y) > ρn
(
1− p(1−q)q
)
(1− ε2).
(70)
Note that fxy10 (x,y) = f
xs
11 (x, s) and f
xy
11 (x,y) = f
xs
10 (x, s) (as illustrated in Figure 6), hence the constraint in (70)
is equivalent to nf
xs
11 (x, s) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + ε1),
nfxs10 (x, s) > ρn
(
1− p(1−q)q
)
(1− ε2).
(71)
We further notice that fxs10 (x, s) = f
xz
11 (x, z) − fxs11 (x, s) + fxz10 (x, z), and fxz10 (x, z), fxz11 (x, z) are tightly
concentrated since z ∈ AZ and x ∈ AX|z. By setting ε1 = 1log(n) and ε2 = p−pq(q−p+pq) log(n) , the constraints
in (71) is also equivalent to nf
xs
11 (x, s) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + 1log(n) ),
nfxs11 (x, s) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + 1log(n) ) +O(n−1/8).
(72)
Without loss of correctness, we ignore the lower order term O(n−1/8) in (72) in the following analysis. Let
i0 = ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + 1log(n) ) be the minimum amount of intersections between x and s such that x is killed by s.
A codeword x does not fall into the list L(x+ s) if i0 ≤ nfxs11 (x, s) ≤ nfxz11 . For a randomly generated codewords
X, the probability that it falls into the type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) and does not fall into the list L(X+s) is bounded
from above as
Pr
X
(
X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩X /∈ L(X+ s)
)
(73)
= Pr
X
(
X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )
) · Pr
X
(
X /∈ L(X+ s)∣∣X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )) (74)
= 2−t·IJ (q)
√
n+O(n1/4) · Pr
X
(
X /∈ L(X+ s)∣∣X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )) (75)
= 2−t·IJ (q)
√
n+O(n1/4) ·
∑nfxz11
i=i0
(
pn
i
)(
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i
)(
n(fxz00 +f
xz
10 )
nfxz10
)
(n(fxz01 +fxz11 )
nfxz11
)(n(fxz00 +fxz10 )
nfxz10
) (76)
= 2−t·IJ (q)
√
n+O(n1/4) ·
∑nfxz11
i=i0
(
pn
i
)(
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i
)
(n(fxz01 +fxz11 )
nfxz11
) (77)
= 2−t·IJ (q)
√
n+O(n1/4) ·
∑nfxz11
i=i0
(
pn
i
)(
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i
)
∑nfxz11
j=0
(
pn
j
)(n(fxz01 +fxz11 )−pn
nfxz11 −j
) . (78)
The calculation in (75) follows the results obtained in Claim 2. In equation (76), the denominator is the total
number of (x, z) pairs that belong to TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), while the numerator is the number of (x, z) pairs that belong
to TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) and are simultaneously killed by s. In equation (78), we reformulate the denominator such that
it has similar structure to the numerator. Let the auxiliary function g(i) be defined as
g(i) =
(
pn
i
)(
n (fxz01 + f
xz
11 )− pn
nfxz11 − i
)
. (79)
To find the maximum value of g(i) when 0 ≤ i ≤ nfxz11 , we calculate the ratio between the two successive terms
in the following:
g(i+ 1)
g(i)
=
(
pn
i+1
)(
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i−1
)
(
pn
i
)(n(fxz01 +fxz11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i
) = (pn− i)(nfxz11 )(i+ 1)(fxz01 − pn+ i+ 1) . (80)
Let φ , pf
xz
11 n
2−nfxz01 +pn−1
nfxz01 +nf
xz
11 +2
. It turns out that g(i + 1)/g(i) > 1 when i < φ, and g(i + 1)/g(i) < 1 when i > φ,
which means the function g(i) achieves its maximum when i = dφe. Note that the parameter φ itself depends on
fxz01 and f
xz
11 , i.e., the particular type class. One can prove that for typical z and conditionally typical type class
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), the maximum value of φ is always bounded from above as
φ ≤ ρnp(1− q)
q
(
1 + n−1/8
)
, φmax. (81)
Note that as n grows without bound, i0 is larger than φmax, hence g(i0) is always smaller than g(φmax). On the
other hand, g(i0) is always greater than g(˜i), for any i˜ > i0. We now bound the second term in (78) as∑nfxz11
i=i0
(
pn
i
)(
n(fxz01 +f
xz
11 )−pn
nfxz11 −i
)
∑nfxz11
j=0
(
pn
j
)(n(fxz01 +fxz11 )−pn
nfxz11 −j
) ≤ ∑nf
xz
11
i=i0
g(i)
g(φ)
≤
∑nfxz11
i=i0
g(i)
g(φmax)
≤ g(i0) · log(n)
g(φmax)
. (82)
The last step follows from the geometric sequence
nfxz11∑
i=i0
g(i) =
∞∑
i=i0
g(i) = g(i0) + g(i0)
g(i0 + 1)
g(i0)
+ g(i0)
g(i0 + 1)
g(i0)
g(i0 + 2)
g(i0 + 1)
+ · · · · · · (83)
≤ g(i0) + g(i0)g(i0 + 1)
g(i0)
+ g(i0)
(
g(i0 + 1)
g(i0)
)2
+ · · · · · · (84)
= g(i0) ·
1−
(
g(i0+1)
g(i0)
)∞
1− g(i0+1)g(i0)
(85)
≤ g(i0) · log(n), (86)
where inequality (84) holds since g(i+ 1)/g(i) is monotonically decreasing, and inequality (86) follows from the
fact g(i0 + 1)/g(i0) ≤ 1− 1/ log(n).
To calculate the ratio between g(i0) and g(φmax), we need to introduce an interpolation point φ′ , ρnp(1−q)q
(
1 + 1(log(n))2
)
.
Note that g(φmax) ≥ g(φ′) since φ′ ≥ φmax and g(i) is monotonically decreasing when i ≥ φmax. Now we consider
the ratio between g(i0) and g(φmax).
g(i0)
g(φmax)
≤ g(i0)
g(φ′)
=
g(φ′ + 1)
g(φ′)
g(φ′ + 2)
g(φ′ + 1)
g(φ′ + 3)
g(φ′ + 2)
· · · g(i0)
g(i0 − 1) (87)
≤
(
g(φ′ + 1)
g(φ′)
)i0−φ′
(88)
=(
1− 1
(log(n))2
) tp(1−q)√n
q
(
1
log(n)
− 1
(log(n))2
)
(89)
≤
(
1− 1
(log(n))2
)c1√n/ log(n)
, (90)
for some constant c1 > 0. Inequality (89) follows since g(φ′+1)/g(φ′) ≤ 1−1/(log(n))2. Using the approximation
limn→∞(1 + 1/n)n = 1/e, as n grows without bound, we obtain
g(i0)
g(φmax)
≤ e−c1
√
n/(log(n))3 , (91)
By combining (78), (82) and (91), we finally show that
Pr
X
(
X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩X /∈ L(X+ s)
) ≤ 2−(t·IJ (q)+c2/(log(n))3)√n+O(n1/4), (92)
where c2 = c1 ln 2. Without loss of correctness, we ignore the lower order term to simplify the following analysis.
The expected number of codewords falling into the type class TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ), and is simultaneously killed by s
equals
µ2 , EC
(∣∣m : Xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩Xmh(m) /∈ L(Xmh(m) + s)∣∣) (93)
= 2r
√
n · Pr
X
(
X ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩X /∈ L(X+ s)
)
(94)
≤ 2(c−c2/(log(n))3)
√
n, (95)
where c = r − t · IJ(q) > 0. The probability that more than 1 · 2c
√
n messages that falls into the type class
TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) as well as being killed by s is bounded from above as
Pr
C
(∣∣m : Xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩Xmh(m) /∈ L(Xmh(m) + s)∣∣ ≥ 1 · 2c√n) (96)
= Pr
C
(∣∣m : Xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩Xmh(m) /∈ L(Xmh(m) + s)∣∣ ≥
(
1 +
1 · 2c
√
n
µ2
− 1
)
µ2
)
(97)
≤ exp
(
−1
3
(
1 · 2c
√
n
µ2
− 1
)
µ2
)
(98)
≤ exp
(
−2
c
√
n
3
(
1 − 2−c2
√
n/(log(n))3
))
. (99)
By setting 1 = exp(−n1/4), we have
Pr
C
(∣∣m : Xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩Xmh(m) /∈ L(Xmh(m) + s)∣∣ < exp(−n1/4) · 2c√n) ≥ 1− exp(−2O(√n)) .
Claim 10. With probability at least 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen code C satisfies
max
pS|Z,C
 1N ∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m)∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}
 ≤ exp(−n 14 + 1).
Proof: By Claims 8 and 9, a randomly chosen code C satisfies∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩ xmh(m) /∈ L(x+ s)∣∣∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣ < exp(−n
1/4) · 2c
√
n
(1− exp(−n1/4)) · 2c√n (100)
≤ exp(−n1/4 + 1), (101)
with probability at least 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design. We now turn to analyze the term in (68). For
any jamming strategy pS|Z,C , we have
1N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m)∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)} (102)
=
1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
∑
m:xmh(m)∈TX|z(fxz10 ,fxz11 )
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)}
(103)
=
1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C)
·
∣∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ) ∩ xmh(m) /∈ L(xmh(m) + s)∣∣∣ (104)
w.h.p.
≤ exp(−n
1
4 + 1)
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
pZ|X(z|TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 ))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) ·
∣∣∣m : xmh(m) ∈ TX|z(fxz10 , fxz11 )∣∣∣
(105)
= exp(−n 14 + 1) · 1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
(fxz10 ,f
xz
11 )∈Fxzn
∑
m:xmh(m)∈TX|z(fxz10 ,fxz11 )
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) (106)
≤ exp(−n 14 + 1) · 1
N
∑
z
∑
m
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) (107)
= exp(−n 14 + 1). (108)
Inequality (105) follows from (100), and holds with probability at least 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design.
Note that in (105) we need to take a union bound over exponentially many z, s and (fxz10 , f
xz
11 ), which is valid
since 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)) is super-exponentially large. Equation (106) follows since
∑
s pS|Z,C(s|z, C) = 1, and
inequality (107) is obtained by relaxing the constraints on z and m. Note that equations (102)-(108) holds for
arbitrary jamming strategy pS|Z,C , hence Claim 10 is proved.
By combining Claim 6, Claim 7, and Claim 10, we finally prove that with probability at least 1−exp(−O(n1/4))
over the code design, a randomly chosen code C ensures the probability of the error event E1 is bounded from
above as
P (1)e (C) ≤ exp(−n1/8) + exp(−n1/4) + exp(−n
1
4 + 1) ≤ 3 exp(−n1/8). (109)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
2) Proof of Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. With probability at least 1− exp(−O(√n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen code C ensures
that the error event E2 occurs with probability at most exp(−n1/4).
Recall that the error event E2 occurs if more than n2 codewords in C falls into the list L(y). In Claim 11 we
consider a typical xmh(m) is transmitted and an arbitrary jamming vector s with wtH(s) ≤ pn is generated by
James. To bound the total number of codewords falling into the list L(y), we focus on the rest of the codebook
C \ xmh(m).
Claim 11. Fix a typical transmitted codeword xmh(m) and a jamming vector s. With probability at least 1 −
exp(−O(n5/2)) over the code design, the number of codewords x′ 6= xmh(m) falling into the list L(xmh(m) + s)
is bounded from above by n2.
Proof: The Hamming weight of Bob’s received vector y = xmh(m) + s satisfies
wtH(y) = wtH
(
xmh(m) + s
) ≤ wtH(xmh(m)) + wtH(s) ≤ 2ρn+ pn,
since wtH(s) ≤ pn, wtH(xmh(m)) ≤ 2ρn for typical xmh(m), and the intersection between xmh(m) and s is greater
than zero. For any codeword Xm′h′ where (m′, h′) 6= (m,h(m)), Xm′h′ ∈ L(y) if and only ifnf
XY
10 (Xm′h′ ,y) < ρn
(
p(1−q)
q
)
(1 + ε1),
nfXY11 (Xm′h′ ,y) > ρn
(
1− p(1−q)q
)
(1− ε2).
Note that the complement of the support of y has size greater than (1− p)n− 2ρn, and hence we have
EXm′h′
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y)
) ≥ ρ ((1− p)n− 2ρn) ,
since each bit of Xm′h′ is generated i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(ρ). Let κ1 = 1− (p−pq)(1+ε1)q−pq+2ρq . By the Chernoff
bound, we have
Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y) < ρn
(
p(1− q)
q
)
(1 + ε1)
)
(110)
= Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y) < (1− κ1)EC
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y)
))
(111)
= 2−D(ρ(1−κ1)‖ρ)((1−p)n−2ρn) log e. (112)
Similarly, since wtH(y) ≤ 2ρn+ pn, we have
EXm′h′
(
nfXY11 (Xm′h′ ,y)
) ≤ ρ (2ρn+ pn) .
Let κ2 =
(q−p+pq)(1−ε2)
q(2ρ+p) − 1. By the Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY11 (Xm′h′ ,y) > ρn
(
1− p(1− q)
q
)
(1− ε2)
)
(113)
= Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y) > (1 + κ2)EC
(
nfXY11 (Xm′h′ ,y)
))
(114)
= 2−D(ρ(1+κ2)‖ρ)(pn+2ρn) log e. (115)
By combining inequalities (112) and (115), we are able to show that the probability of another codeword Xi′h′
falling into the list L(y) is given as
Pr
Xm′h′
(Xm′h′ ∈ L(y))
= Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY10 (Xm′h′ ,y) < ρn
(
p(1− q)
q
)
(1 + ε1)
)
· Pr
Xm′h′
(
nfXY11 (Xm′h′ ,y) > ρn
(
1− p(1− q)
q
)
(1− ε2)
)
n→∞
= 2−t·IB(p,q)
√
n, (116)
since the two events (the number of ones of Xm′h′ inside the support of y and outside the support of y) are
independent. On expectation, the total number of codewords (except the transmitted codeword xmh(m)) falling into
the list L(y) equals 2(r−t·IB(p,q))
√
n, which is super-polynomially small since r < t · IB(p, q). Therefore, we are
able to use a counting argument to characterize the probability that more than n2 codewords falling into the list
L(y) as below. As long as r < t · IB(p, q), we have
Pr
C\xmh(m)
(∣∣X ∈ C \ xmh(m) : X ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2) (117)
=
2r
√
n∑
i=n2
Pr
C\xmh(m)
(∣∣X ∈ C \ xmh(m) : X ∈ L(y)∣∣ = i) (118)
=
2r
√
n∑
i=n2
(
2r
√
n
i
)(
2−t·IB(p,q)
√
n
)i (
1− 2−t·IB(p,q)
√
n
)(2r√n−i)
(119)
≤ 2r
√
n
(
2r
√
n
n2
)(
2−t·IB(p,q)
√
n
)n2
(120)
≤ 2r
√
n
(
e · 2r
√
n
n2
)n2 (
2−t·IB(p,q)
√
n
)n2
(121)
= 2r
√
n
(
e · 2(r−t·IB(p,q))
√
n
n2
)n2
(122)
= exp(−O(n5/2)). (123)
Inequality (120) follows since i = n2 maximizes the probability in (118), and we bound the number of summations
from above by 2r
√
n. Inequality (121) holds since
(
n
k
) ≤ (en/k)k. Finally, we obtain (123) since r < t·IB(p, q).
In the following we also consider the atypical events and formally prove that with high probability over the code
design, a randomly chosen code C ensures the error events E2 goes to zero. The error events E2 is given as
P (2)e = max
pS|Z,C
{∑
m
pM (m)
∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}
}
= max
pS|Z,C
{
1
N
∑
m
∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}
}
.
Note that regardless of pS|Z,C ,
EC
[
1
N
∑
m
∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}
]
(124)
= EC
[∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}
]
(125)
=
∑
xmh(m)
pX(xmh(m))
∑
C\xmh(m)
pC\X(C \ xmh(m))
∑
z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
·
∑
s
pS|Z,C(s|z, C) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}} (126)
≤
∑
xmh(m)∈AX
pX(xmh(m))
∑
s
∑
C\xmh(m)
pC\X(C \ xmh(m)) · 1{
∣∣x ∈ C \ xmh(m) : x ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2}
+
∑
xmh(m) /∈AX
pX(xmh(m)) (127)
≤
∑
xmh(m)∈AX
pX(xmh(m))
∑
s
Pr
C\xmh(m)
(∣∣X ∈ C \ xmh(m) : X ∈ L(y)∣∣ ≥ n2)+ ∑
xmh(m) /∈AX
pX(xmh(m)) (128)
w.h.p.
≤
(∑
s
exp(−O(n5/2))
)
+ exp
(
−1
3
t(q, d)
√
n
)
(129)
= exp(−O(√n)). (130)
Equation (125) is obtained by noting that for each message m, the averaged probability of error (over the code
design) is the same. The notation pC\X(C \ xmh(m)) in (126) represents the probability of generating a code C
excluding the transmitted codeword xmh(m). In (127), we again consider the transmitted codeword xmh(m) to be
either typical or atypical, and
• For atypical xmh(m), we simply bound the indicator function 1(.) from above by one.
• For typical xmh(m), we bound the probability pS|Z,C(s|z, C) from above by one, and then interchange the
order of summations.
Inequality (129) follows from Claim 11 (which is valid for all typical transmitted codewords), and holds with
probability at least 1 − exp(−O(n5/2)). Finally, by noting that (130) holds for every possible jamming strategy
pS|Z,C , the Markov’s inequality yields
Pr
C
(
P (2)e ≥ exp(−n1/4)
)
≤ exp(−O(√n)). (131)
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
It is worth noting that the probability of error event E4 (corresponding to Alice is silent) can also be bounded in
a similarly manner (the reasons will be clear in the detailed proof), hence we skip the analysis of E4 here.
3) Analysis of error event E3:
Lemma 5. The error event E3 occurs with probability (over the common randomness K) at most O
(
1√
n log(n)
)
.
The error event E3 occurs if there exists x′ 6= xmh(m) such that x′ ∈ L and x′ is consistent with K. Recall that
we partition the 6 log(n)-bits common randomness K into two equal parts K1 and K2, and partition the message
M into 3 log(n)-sized small chunks, M1,M2, . . . ,Ml, where l =
r
√
n
3 log(n) . In subsection VI-B we first define the
polynomial hash function of K1,K2 and M as
h = K2 +
l∑
i=1
Ki1Mi. (132)
From James’ perspective the shared key K is uniformly distributed a priori. However, once James receives the
vector z the distribution may not necessarily be uniform. Though he gains some information from the observation
z, James is unable to decode which message/codeword is transmitted. To simplify our analysis, We now assume
there’s another oracle who reveals extra information to James — the message-hash pair (m,h) being transmitted.
Once James knows (m,h), he certainly knows the shared key satisfies h = K2 +
∑l
i=1K
i
1mi. However, the number
of (K1,K2) pairs satisfying this equation is exactly n3, and each pair contains a distinct K1, hence from James’
perspective the first part of the key, K1, is still uniformly distributed.10
Alice’s transmission pair (m,h) is consistent with the shared key K by default. For any message-hash pair
(m′, h′) 6= (m,h), the probability that (m′, h′) is consistent with the common randomness K equals
Pr
K
(
h′ = K2 +
l∑
i=1
Ki1m
′
i
∣∣∣h = K2 + l∑
i=1
Ki1mi
)
= Pr
K
(
h′ − h =
l∑
i=1
Ki1(m
′
i −mi)
)
≤ l/n3, (133)
by applying the Schwartz–Zippel lemma. Since the number of codewords x′ 6= xmh(m) in the list L is at most
n2, by taking a union bound, one can prove that with probability at least 1−O(1/(√n log(n))) over the common
randomness K, none of these codewords are consistent with K.
Note that the analysis of error event E5 is exactly the same as that of E3 since it does not depends on whether
or not Alice is transmitting, hence we also skip the analysis of E5 here.
E. Achievability scheme with large ∆(n)
For any values of (p, q) such that IJ(q) > IB(p, q) > 0, the optimal throughput t(q, d) · IB(p, q) is achiev-
able with O(log(n)) + t(q, )(IJ(q) − IB(p, q))
√
n bits of shared key. We highlight the difference between this
achievability scheme and the scheme introduced in subsection VI-B. The public codebook C contains roughly
2t(q,)(IJ (q)−IB(p,q))
√
n sub-codebooks, and each of size roughly 2t(q,d)IB(p,q)
√
n. The extra t(q, )(IJ(q)−IB(p, q))
√
n
bits of shared key K˜ is used for Alice and Bob to select which sub-codebook is used during transmission, and
the selected codebook is kept secret from James. Note that each sub-codebook also contains O(log(n)) bits of
shared key and it is critical for list decoding. The size of each sub-codebook is small enough so that Bob can
decode reliably (as proved in subsection VI-D). On the other hand, from James’ perspective the size of the whole
codebook (contains more than 2t(q,d)IJ (q)
√
n codewords) is also sufficiently large, since he does not know which
sub-codebook is used. Therefore, as proved in subsection VI-C, the covertness requirement can also be guaranteed.
VII. COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
The achievability scheme in Section VI relies on the random codes, and the computational complexities of en-
coding and decoding grow super-polynomially with the blocklength n. In this Section we develop a computationally
efficient coding scheme which is proven to be both covert and reliable.
A. Permutation-based coding scheme
Recall that for covert communication, the average Hamming weights of codewords should be O(√n), and the rate
R scales as O(1/√n). Instead of generating a low-weight (or low-rate) code directly, we now generate a code C˜
of length d
√
n and rate R, where d and R scale as constants, hence the fraction of ones in the code also scales as a
constant. The code C˜ consists of 2dR
√
n codewords X˜. To satisfy the covertness constraint, Alice uses a uniformly
distributed shared key Π1 to select d
√
n locations (out of n locations), and insert X˜ (of length d
√
n bits) into
these locations. The key Π1 of size log
((
n
d
√
n
))
= O(√n log(n)) is only shared between Alice and Bob. All the
locations except for those d
√
n locations selected by Π1 comprising entirely of zeros. For the purpose of analysis,
we introduce another log ((d
√
n)!) = O(√n log(n)) bits of shared key Π2 (between Alice and Bob), which is used
to permute the d
√
n bits (inside the codewords X˜). A length-n sequence Xˆ = Π2(Π1(X˜)) is obtained after the
two permutations. Note that to guarantee covertness, the parameter d, which determines the length of C˜, cannot
10Note that K2 may or may not be uniformly distributed from James’ perspective
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Fig. 7: A polynomial time algorithm D1 that can distinguish K = P and K = R based on the assumptions on the estimator
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Fig. 8: A polynomial time algorithm D2 that can distinguish K = P and K = R based on the assumptions on the decoder Γ.
be arbitrarily large (a larger d implies a larger average Hamming weight of Xˆ). It turns out that as long as d is
bounded from above as d ≤ t(q,d)ρ∗ =
2
√
q(1−q)
ρ∗(1−2q) ·Q−1
(
1−d
2
)
, (1− d)-covertness can be guaranteed.
In the following let’s focus on the selected d
√
n locations corresponding to X˜. Since Π1 and Π2 are uniformly
distributed from James’ perspective, he seems unlikely to estimate the d
√
n locations selected by Π1. Nevertheless,
James can perform the BAC-type jamming on the length-n sequence Xˆ (since it only depends on his observation z)
– flip Xˆi with probability approximately p/q if Zi = 1, and does not flip Xˆi if Zi = 0 (as described in Section V).
Effectively, this attack roughly flips p fraction of zeros and (1 − q)p/q fraction of ones of X˜, irrespective of the
permutations Π1 and Π2 that Alice and Bob use.
One may notice that even if James does not know any information about Π1 a priori, he is still able to learn
something non-trivial from z. For example, if the channel from Alice to James is a noiseless channel, James will
know exactly the locations corresponding to the support of z must be selected by Π1 (though he is unable to infer
all the d
√
n locations selected by Π1). If the channel to James is a BSC(q), he can still learn some information
about Π1, though not as much as the noiseless case. However, by a carefully designed oracle-based argument, we
are able to show that there are super-polynomially many “plausible” permutations Π1×Π2 from James’ perspective,
and each with equal probability. Under specific permutations pi1 and pi2, a jamming vector s is said to outperform
the BAC-type jamming if s flips more than p(1+ε) fraction of zeros or more than (1−q)p(1+ε)/q fraction of ones
in X˜. We are able to show that no matter which jamming vector s James chooses, only under an extremely small
fraction of plausible permutations, s will outperform the BAC-type jamming. This implies that with high probability
over the permutations, the channel between Alice and Bob is not worse than a binary asymmetric channel with
Pr(Y = 1|X = 0) = p(1 + ε) and Pr(Y = 0|X = 1) = (1 − q)p(1 + ε)/q. Therefore, the length-d√n code C˜
should satisfy the following properties:
1) C˜ is robust to the binary asymmetric channel described above, and also achieves the channel capacity CBAC(p, q).
2) The encoding and decoding of C˜ is computationally efficient.
The existence of such C˜ is guaranteed by Forney’s concatenated codes, which provides a generic computationally
efficient code construction for arbitrary discrete memeryless channels. Hence the optimal relative throughput of the
permutation-based coding scheme equals dR = t(q,d)ρ∗ · CBAC(p, q).
B. Computational assumptions on the adversary
As is usual in the standard “cryptographic” setting, the computational power of the adversary is always restricted
to be polynomial in the blocklength n. Here we also make this assumption on James, by introducing a pseudorandom
generator (PRG) and reusing the coding scheme in subsection VII-A, we can hope for a computationally efficient
coding scheme with much less amount of shared key. We rely in the “standard” assumption that PRGs exist, i.e.,
there exists an efficiently computable function g : {0, 1}nξ → {0, 1}
√
n such that if U ∼ Unif({0, 1}nξ) and
K ∼ Unif({0, 1}
√
n), then for all polynomial time computable functions A : {0, 1}
√
n → {0, 1},∣∣∣Pr
U
(A(g(U) = 1)− Pr
K
(A(K) = 1)
∣∣∣ ∈ o(1).
We say K = P if the ∆(n) bits of shared key comes from the output of a PRG with a length-nξ seed (∀ξ > 0), and
K = R if the ∆(n) bits of shared key is truly uniformly distributed. As stated in Definition 1, (1− d)-covertness
requires that
∀Φ, Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) + Pr(Tˆ = 0|T = 1,K = P) ≥ 1− d. (134)
By using the triangle inequality, it suffices to show that{
∀Φ, Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 1,K = R)− Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 1,K = P) ≤ δ, where δ  d,
∀Φ, Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 0) + Pr(Tˆ = 0|T = 1,K = R) ≥ 1− (d − δ).
(135)
Note that the second condition is satisfied if the coding scheme in subsection VII-A is covert, since the shared key
used there is truly uniformly distributed. Hence it suffices to focus on the first condition in equation (135) only.
Suppose there is a polynomial time estimator Φ such that Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 1,K = R) − Pr(Tˆ = 1|T = 1,K =
P) > δ, i.e., K is more likely to equal R if Φ outputs Tˆ = 1, then James is able to design a polynomial time
algorithm D1 to distinguish P and P with f1(δ) advantage (for some function f1(.)), by generating an artificial
system that contains message, encoder, channel and estimator Φ (as shown in figure 7). The algorithm D1 is valid
since both the encoder and the estimator are efficient. The algorithm D1 decides K = P if Φ outputs Tˆ = 1, and
decides K = R if Φ outputs Tˆ = 0.
On the other hand, we also need to show that using PRG does not increase the probability of error “too much”.
Suppose there is a polynomial time decoder Γ satisfying
Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |K = P)− Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |K = R) > δ.
Similarly, Bob is able to design a polynomial time algorithm D2 to distinguish P and R with f2(δ) advantage
(for some function f2(.)), by generating an artificial system as illustrated in Figure 8, which is also valid since the
encoder and the decoder Γ are efficient. The algorithm D2 outputs K = R if Mˆ = M , and outputs K = P if
Mˆ 6= M . The assumptions on the decoder Γ implies the polynomial time algorithm D2 can distinguish K = P
or K = R with f2(δ) advantage (for some function f2(.)). Therefore, we conclude that for any polynomial time
decoder Γ, the
Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |K = P)− Pr
M,K,S¯,S
(M 6= Mˆ |K = R) ≤ δ, (136)
and the probability of error does not increase significantly.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CLAIMS 3-5 (COVERTNESS)
Claim 3 (Second term in (35)). 12EC
(∑
z/∈AZ p1(z)
) ≤ exp (−O(√n)) .
Proof: Note that the ensemble-averaged active distribution EC(p1) is essentially a Binomial(n, ρ ∗ q) distribution,
since each bit of the codeword X is generated i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(ρ), and then passes through a BSC(q).
By applying the Chernoff bound, we show that
1
2
EC
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z)
 = 1
2
Pr
M,K,S¯
(Z /∈ AZ) (137)
=
1
2
Pr
M,K,S¯
(
fz1 (Z) /∈ (ρ ∗ q) · (1± n−
1
4 )
)
(138)
≤ exp
(
−1
3
(ρ ∗ q)√n
)
. (139)
Claim 4 (First term in (35)). 12EC
(∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
)
≤ exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
.
Proof: Since each codeword x is uniformly selected from the codebook, we rewrite the first term in (35) as
1
2
EC
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
 = 1
2
1
|C|
∑
x∈C
EC
(∑
z
pZ|X(z|x)1
{
(z ∈ AZ) ∩ (x ∈ AX|z)
})
(140)
=
1
2
EC
(∑
z
pZ|X(z|x)1
{
(z ∈ AZ) ∩ (x ∈ AX|z)
})
(141)
=
1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
∑
z
pX(x)pZ|X(z|x)1
{
(z ∈ AZ) ∩ (x ∈ AX|z)
}
(142)
=
1
2
Pr
XZ
(
Z ∈ AZ ∩X ∈ AX|z
)
(143)
≤ 1
2
Pr
XZ
(
X ∈ AX|z
)
(144)
=
1
2
Pr
XZ
(
fxz10 (X,Z) /∈ ρq(1± n−
1
8 ) or fxz11 (X,Z) /∈ ρ(1− q)(1± n−
1
8 )
)
(145)
≤ exp
(
−q · t(q, d)
3
n
1
4
)
+ exp
(
− (1− q) · t(q, d)
3
n
1
4
)
. (146)
We simplify the notation in (141) since the expectation EC(.) for each codeword x ∈ C is exactly the same, and the
number of codewords is |C|. It is worth noting that pX(x) in (142) is the probability of generating a codeword x
(which follows from an i.i.d. Bernoulli(ρ) distribution), instead of the probability of a codeword being transmitted.
Equation (145) follows from the definition of the conditionally typical set AX|z in equation (19), while (146) is
due to the Chernoff bound.
Claim 5 (Term in (36)). With probability at least 1 − exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design, a randomly chosen
code C satisfies
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) + 1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z) ≤ exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
. (58)
Proof: Note that
1
2
exp(−n 14 ) (147)
w.h.p.
>
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
C
pC(C)
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)−
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (148)
≥ 1
2
EC
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
− 1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) (149)
=
1
2
1− EC
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
− EC
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z)
− ∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
 (150)
≥ − exp (−O(√n))− exp(−O (n 14))+ 1
2
1− ∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
 (151)
Inequality (148) follows from equation (57), and holds with probability at least 1−exp(−2O(
√
n)). Inequality (149)
is due to the triangle inequality, while (151) follows from Claims 3 and 4. Therefore,
1
2
∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C\AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x) + 1
2
∑
z/∈AZ
p1(z) =
1
2
1− ∑
z∈AZ
∑
x∈C∩AX|z
pZ|X(z|x)p(x)
 (152)
w.h.p.
≤ 1
2
exp(−n 14 ) + exp (−O(√n))+ exp(−O (n 14)) (153)
= exp
(
−O
(
n
1
4
))
, (154)
where inequality (153) holds with probability at least 1− exp(−2O(
√
n)) over the code design.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF CLAIMS 6 AND 7 (RELIABILITY)
Claim 6 (First term in (69)). With probability at least 1− exp(−O(n1/4)) over the code design,
1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) < exp(−n1/8).
Proof: First note that the expected value is bounded from above as
EC
 1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
 ≤ exp(−O(n1/4)), (155)
which directly follows from the proof of Claim 4 in Appendix A. Finally, by applying the Markov’s inequality, we
have
Pr
C
 1
N
∑
z∈AZ
∑
m:xmh(m) /∈AX|z
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) ≥ exp(−n1/8)
 ≤ exp(−O(n1/4)). (156)
Claim 7 (Second term in (69)). With probability at least 1− exp(−O(√n)) over the code design,
1
N
∑
m
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) < exp(−n1/4).
Proof: The expected value is bounded from above as
EC
 1
N
∑
m
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m))
 ≤ exp(−O(√n)), (157)
which follows from the proof of Claim 3 in Appendix A. By the Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr
C
 1
N
∑
m
∑
z/∈AZ
pZ|X(z|xmh(m)) ≥ exp(−n1/4)
 ≤ exp(−O(√n)). (158)
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